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PUT YOUR MONEY WHERE YOUR WATER IS:
BUILDING RESILIENCE THROUGH RATES
AMY HARDBERGERt
I. INTRODUCTION
California is in the fourth year of a record drought. Although the state
has known drought before, this is being reported as "driest period in the
state's recorded rainfall history" and scientists worry that this is just the
beginning.1 Thirty eight million people live in the state, and millions of
acres of farmland are responsible for growing food that stock store shelves
across the U.S.2 As crisis sets in, many solutions are proposed including
new, expensive technologies.3 Although very expensive, the thought seems
to be, "in an emergency, price becomes no object."'4 While perhaps an
understandable sentiment, it is also ironic. Despite the current shortage,
Californians currently pay very little for the water they still do have. 5 The
average monthly water bill in Californian ranges from $40 - $70 depending
on the region.6  This is often much less than the average bill for cable,
cellphones or broadband service. 7 Water bills are sure to rise once current
water resources are gone, sending a price signal that is needed now.
Unfortunately, this scenario is not unique to California.
Amy Hardberger is an Associate Professor at St. Mary's University School of Law, email:
ahardbergerttstmaiytx.edu. Special thanks to Vermont Law School and the participants of the 2015
Scholarship Colloquium for providing feedback on this article, particularly Inara Scott.
'Paul Rogers, California Drought: Past Dry Periods Have Lasted more than 200 Years, Scientists Say,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci-24993601/




5 Jane Wells, West Coast drought: Why California water is so cheap, CNBC (May 28, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/28/west-coast-drought-why-california-water-is-so-cheap.html.
6 Id.
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Water resources are in crisis throughout many parts of the United
States.8 This is particularly true in drought-prone areas where population
growth and demand are quickly outpacing supply.9 New supply projects are
often proposed to solve the shortfall; however, these programs may create
new problems.'" Expensive new supply technologies can greatly increase
the price of water sending a price signal to consumers to use less water just
as more is becoming available.
Utilities are challenged to meet future water demands." To do this, they
must accurately predict what a city's water needs will be. Traditionally,
demand projections are calculated by extrapolating per capita for population
projections. 12 The danger is that demand projections often assume
traditional use and do not include maximum reduction through conservation
and efficiency.' 3 When usage changes either through implementation of
these programs or from unexpected weather changes, demand alters
dramatically, which can create a revenue shortfall."' Accordingly, many see
any efforts to reduce usage as threats to the reliability of income to the utility
creating an economic disincentive. However, that is not true. Revenues
can be maintained as usage is reduced as long as the uncertainties are
minimized. 1
6
To achieve supply longevity, customers should be aware of the
importance of current supply and adjust their behavior accordingly. One
way to affect demand before a shortage occurs is through appropriate
pricing."7 Before scarcity forces a change in behavior, a customer's only
connection with water is its price. 8 As such, prices should reflect the value
of current supply to encourage protection through conservation, efficiency
and value-based use decisions.
Rates are usually based on the utility's cost of service. 9 The law
requires the utilities to charge reasonable rates without discrimination
'See Matt Ferner, These 11 Cities May Completely Run Out of Water Sooner Than You Think, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/04/water-
shortage n 4378418.html.
'Doyle Rice, Water Worries: Climate Change in the Desert Southwest, USA TODAY, July 9, 2013.
10 See PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: THE POTENTIAL FOR URBAN WATER
CONSERVATION IN CALIFORNIA (2003), available at http://www.pacinst.org/wp-contentl/uploads/
sites/21/2013/02/waste not want not full report3.pdf.
11 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, BUILDING BETTER WATER RATES FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD:
BALANCING REVENUE MANAGEMENT, RESOURCE EFFICIENCY AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 28 (2014).
12 Id.
13 See GLEICK, supra note 10.
14 See id.
15 See ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, DECLINING WATER SALES AND UTILITY REVENUES: A
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND ADAPTING 3 (2012).
16 Id.
17 ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE MARKET AND PUBLIC
CHOICE 11 (6th ed. 2000).
is Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1873 (2005).
19 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 14.
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allowing a fair rate of return. 20  Unfortunately, current cost-of-service
models mandated in most areas dictate that citizens generally only pay for a
utility's current costs, which may only include treatment and delivery and
not a price for the actual water.2' The existing pricing model is problematic
because it does not value water until there is not enough to go around. In
addition, the existing pricing model is flawed because there is no mechanism
for a rapid rate adjustment to affect behavior and scale back demand in
emergency situations.22 This can lead to water shortages.
Water is critical not only to personal survival and to the survival of the
economy and culture of a community as well as their various users such as
power generators, agriculture and industry.23 Society's ability to survive and
thrive depends on the guarantee of sufficient water supplies, yet that is not a
luxury upon which all locations can rely.24 Sustainable water for all uses
requires a hard review of how economics is applied to water. Any economic
modeling must include value-based pricing that reflects intrinsic costs to
ensure wise allocation decisions. Cost-of-service models must be broadened
to allow pricing based on more than capital costs. Examples from the energy
sector, which reflects increased pricing in times of high demand and strained
supply, should be adopted by the water sector. Until the market currently
applied to water reflects true valuation, water will continue to flow in ways
that do not favor resiliency.
This paper examines the application of basic market principles to water
transactions and the problems it creates. It considers how the basics of utility
cost-of-service based rate structures can create inaccurate price signals
resulting in water supply depletion and other unintended consequences. Part
II examines the current economic situation of water markets and describes
how current pricing of water disincentivizes source protection. Part III
explains the current utility economic model.26 Included in this discussion
are an explanation of why efficiency and revenue collection are not mutually
exclusive, a description of the cost of service rate paradigm and its current
limitations, and how revenues are collected through a combination of fees
and rates. 27 This part also warns that low-income users deserve special
consideration in the pricing conversation.28
2 JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 50 (1961).
21 Robert Glennon, The Price of Water, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES& ENVTL. L. 337, 340 (2004).
22 See e.g., Yvonne Wenger, City Panel Gets Earful From Residents Angry About Rising Water Bills,
THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 26, 2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-06-26/news/bs-md-ci-
water-rate-increase-20130625 1 meter-and-billing-systems-rudolph-chow-water-bills.
21 See, e.g., SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, THE IMPACT OF THE 2011
DROUGHT AND BEYOND (Feb. 6, 2011), available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrptl/
drought/pdf/96-1704-Drought.pdf.24 A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 13 (2013).
25 See discussion infra Part II.
26 See discussion infra Part III.
27 See discussion infra Part III.
28 See discussion infra Part III.
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Finally, Part [V of this paper proposes various best practices to this
water pricing challenge.2 9 The first recommendation is to expand away from
a rigid interpretation of cost of service, which creates a reactionary pricing
scheme. 3" Second, utilities need to adopt a more complex demand
projection calculation that takes many factors into consideration including
climate and demand response.3 ' This paper also recommends rate structures
that create a price signal for the consumer about the value of the resource
while also providing a secure revenue stream for the utility.
32
II. PRICE AND MUNICIAL WATER SUSTAINABILITY
Water scarcity is a growing problem for many parts of the United
States.33 Although the American Southwest has been struggling with water
challenges for many years, even traditionally water-rich areas face the threat
of drought and demand increases. 34 "In the last five years, nearly every
region of the country experienced water shortages. At least 36 states are
anticipating local, regional, or statewide water shortages by 2013, even
under non-drought conditions. 35
One of the challenges with water is how little of it is actually available
for use, even under normal conditions. 6 Less than one percent of the
world's water is available for human use and much of that is located
underground at varying depths. 37 Additionally, not only is the world using
more water, it is being used in ways that often leave it unavailable for other
users.3 8 World water consumption has tripled in the last fifty years.39 This
combination of factors elucidates the depth of the water supply challenge.
Unfortunately, water supply decisions are frequently based on factors such
as availability, location, price and highest economic use rather than on long-
term sustainability.4 ° Water supply issues are particular challenging in
growing cities.
29 See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
1See discussion infra Part IV.B.
12 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
33 Ferner, supra note 8.
34 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER SUPPLY IN THE U.S., http://www.epa.gov/WaterSense/pubs/supply.htmi
(last visited Jaw. 16, 2014).
35 id.
36 WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., WATER FACTS AND TRENDS 1, available at
www.unwater.org/downloads/Water facts and trends.pdf.
37 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 34. Approximately 30% of the world's freshwater is underground,
with varying levels of access challenges. WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 36.
38 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 34.
39 id.
4
1 P. VAN DER ZAAG & H.H.G. SAVENIJE, WATER AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD: THE VALUE OF PRICING AND
THE FAILURE OF MARKETS 15, 20-22 (July 2006).
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A. The Municipal Challenge
Cities have a heightened challenge for water because their populations
are booming.4 The combination of population concentration and limited
water in these areas could impact large amounts of domestic users as well as
the industrial and commercial sectors.4 2 Unlike their rural counterparts,
urban dwellers depend on the municipality for the procurement and delivery
of water to the point of use. This means the city is not only responsible for
the securing supply, it must also build and maintain the infrastructure needed
for delivery and ensure it can maintain this service for newcomers.
Drought exacerbates any existing issues with supply inadequacy. From
2011 to 2013, half of the United States experienced varying levels of
drought.43 At the beginning of 2013, sixty percent of the U.S. experienced
moderate to exceptional drought.4 4 While the drought has alleviated in some
areas, other regions remain in peril.45 Several major metropolitan areas
located on the East Coast, the Midwest and the western United States, are at
risk of a water shortage.46
Despite the varied array of uses and dependencies on water, existing
legal allocation schemes often do not effectively work to ensure water
sustainability. 47 As supply capacity declines, accountability between users
increases and the market is often the only tool available. This can be
problematic because the current water market is incomplete, which leads to
price signals that do not send appropriate signals to users and can increase
waste.48
B. The Distorted Price Signal
While scarcity affects all water users, water sustainability is not the
primary consideration of allocation regimes. 49 At best, current permitting
4" WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HIDDEN CITIES: UNMASKING AND OVERCOMING HEALTH
INEQUITIES IN URBAN SETTINGS 7 (2010) (stating that by 2050, seven out often people will live in urban
settings), http://www.who.int/kobe centre/publications/hiddencities media/who un habitat
hidden cities w.pdf?ua 1.
42 Grace Wyler, AllAround The US, Risk of a Water CrisisAre Much Bigger Than People Realize, BUS.





47 See e.g., Rogers, supra note 1.
48 VAN DER ZAAG & SAVENIJE, supra note 40, at 9; Amy Hardberger, Water Is A Girl's Best Friend.
Examining the Water Valuation Dilemma, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 893, 912-31 (2014) (discussing the ways
current markets would need to change in order to be effective tools for water allocation).
41 Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855). In Irwin, often cited for creating the prior appropriation
system, the court notes that the important aspect of the system is to preserve the rights of those who are
first in time. Id.; TARLOCK, supra note 24, at 267.
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systems are designed to react to a shortage rather than work to avoid one. 50
Existing water permitting relies either on proximity to a water source51 or on
a first come, first serve basis. 52 Unfortunately, due to the meteoric increase
of population and consumption, the water landscape has changed
dramatically from when the majority of rights were perfected or permitted.53
Current projections for many areas show that increased demand coupled
with climate change variations will create shortages even in non-drought
years .'4
Despite this reality, none of these regimes include a legal mechanism to
reevaluate the wisdom or the efficiency of a use once the property right is
perfected. Legal systems may dictate reduced usage in times of drought,
but this reduction is strictly temporary and not tied to any permanent
prioritization of the best uses of the water. 56 The primary mechanism to shift
permitted water from one user to another is markets; however, the buying
and selling of water also does not guarantee protection of the best uses. 5 7 In
fact, "[m]ore than for most commodities, social and cultural values relating
to water are often [SIC] in conflict with economic values. 58 Some market
changes are required to promote resource sustainability.
50 TARLOCK, supra note 24, at 269.
51 p. FRITZ HOLLEMAN, WATER RIGHTS AND TAKINGS: INHERENT LIMITS ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, CLE INTERNATIONAL H-I, H-i-H-2, available at
htp://www.pbblaw.com/articles/Holleman/o20- /o20Water/%2ORights /20and /o20Takings /o200/
2800011376%29.pdf.52
Id. at H-1.
51 In a prior appropriation jurisdiction, any proposed use in a permit application must be deemed
"beneficial." The determination of a right as beneficial occurs at the time of the permit issuance or
perfection of the right. Although the list of approved beneficial uses may change over time, any permit
issued continues to be valid even if the use no longer considered beneficial. The permit is a property
right; therefore, a revocation of a permit based solely on use would be generally be subject to a takings
challenge. Id.
51 Jonathan A. Adler, Warming Up to Water Markets, NAT. RESOURCES 14 (Winter 2008-2009),
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2008/11/v3 ln4-3.pdf.
55 See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.001 (West 2012) (defining water rights as a vested property
right).
56 Such a system can lead to challenging drought scenarios. In a prior appropriation system, many
agricultural permits are senior to newer municipal and power generation permits. In drought conditions,
the system prioritizing access based on the date of the permit and not the type of use; so, a power plant
may need to power down to allow farmers to receive their full allocation.
51 See ERIN SCHILLER & ELIZABETH FOWLER, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE., ENDING CALIFORNIA'S
WATER CRISIS: A MARKET SOLUTION TO THE POLITICS OF WATER 1 (1999), available at
http://special.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/enviro/watennkts/watennkts.html; ROBERT A. YOUNG,
DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER CONCEPTS AND METHODS 8 (2005).
58 YOUNG, supra note 57, at 8.
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1. The Basics of Supply and Demand
The supply and demand curve is one of the primary concepts taught in
a microeconomics class. 59  This curve is an economic model of price
determination in a competitive market.60 Demand indicates what an item is
worth to someone while supply reflects what something costs.
61
Supply is the quantity of an item available in the marketplace at a given
price .6 2 It is directly related to price. The law of supply states that, all other
things being equal, an increase in supply of a product or service will cause
price of the item to decrease. 63 The inverse is also true.64 Although many
things can affect supply, "[t]he most important influence on the position of
the supply curve is the cost of producing a good or service." 65 One example
of this is a price reduction for goods because of the reduction of an input
price, such as labor. 66  The opposite is often seen for water, as more
expensive technology is required to provide adequate supply, price will
increase.67
Demand is the quantity of a good that individuals are willing and able
to purchase at a given price. 68 "The demand curve expresses an inverse
relation between price of a good and the quantity demanded. 69 Similar to
the relationship on the supply side, price and demand are inversely related:
as one increases, the other decreases and visa versa.70 While this is true of
an individual's behavior, the focus for economists is more often on market
demand, which is the amalgamation of individual demand for an item or
service at alternative prices.71 If the number of consumers increases, the
market demand curve will also increase.7 2
Although supply and demand are separate and can work independently
with price, they often work together to determine the market price of an
51 See, e.g., EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17 at 51-81; ROBIN BADE & MICHAEL PARKIN,
FOUNDATIONS OF MICROECONOMICS 83-122 (2d ed. 2004); ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 61-88 (Brief ed. 2009).
6 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 11 (stating a model requires assumption and abstractions
from the real world).
61 Michael Hanemann, The Value of Water 4 (2005), available at http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/
EEP162/springO5/valuewater.pdf.
62 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 61-62; FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 66.
61 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 61-62.
64 id.
65 Id. at 63.
66 Id. at 63-64.
61 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, In California, What Price Water?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/20 13/03/0 1/business/energy-enviroment/a-costly-california-desalination-
plant-bets-on-future-affordability.html? r-0 (discussing the price of an expensive desalination plant in
California).
68 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 54-55.
69 Id. at 60.
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item.73 In a competitive market, the unit price for a particular good will vary
until it settles at a price point when the quantity demanded equals the
quantity supplied. 74 This results in an economic equilibrium for both price
and quantity for the item. 75 Markets are an effective system to allocate
resources because when a good is in equilibrium, the price provides
information to suppliers about the ideal price and demand of that good.76
The market approach can be applied to water. In fact, in the absence of
any limiting polices, it is already happening to some extent. 7 7 While the
initial permitting phase of water is dictated by governments, economics does
come into play in post-permitting water conveyances as a buyer, without
sufficient water (low supply, high demand), purchases water from an
existing permit holder (high supply, low demand). 78  The price for the
conveyance is presumably set based on this supply and demand
relationship. 79 This transaction is simply a market transfer of a property
right.80 Therefore, the appropriate question is not whether this economic
model can be applied to water, but how it can be done to meet community
goals.8
2. Price as a Behavior Trigger
Since communities are already paying for water, it follows that price
could be used to manage the amount of water used and ensure that water is
going to the highest value use.82 It is a basic principle of economics that
people make choices based on a rational self-interest. 8 3 Based on this
assumption, human behavior can be predicted once the costs and benefits
associated with an option are ascertained.84 Price is an obvious cost that
might affect consumer decision-making. 5 It will affect what and how much
of an item is purchased.86 In order for a person to continue purchasing an
Id. at 65-72.
4
FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 68.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 84.
77 TARLOCK, supra note 24, at 12-14.
71 Id. at 13. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.135 (West 2012) (listing the criteria required for
surface water permit issuance in Texas), with Betsy Blaney, T. Boone Pickens sells water rights to Texas
water supplier for $103 million, NEwSOK, June 24, 2011, http://newsok.com/t.-boone-pickens-sells-
water-rights-to-texas-water-supplier-for-103-million/article/3579874 (describing a large water
transaction).
71 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 81-82.
so TARLOCK, supra note 24, at 13.
"' Hanemann, supra note 6 1, at 12.
12 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 178.
8' EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 9.
84 Id.
15 Id. at 11.
86 Id. at 11, 54; see, e.g., Lisa Hymas, How High do Gas Prices Have to get to Trigger Behavior Change?,
GRIST., Mar. 14, 2012 (discussing people's adjusted driving habits as a result of high gas prices for an
extended time period).
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item at an increased cost, the benefit must also increase for the same decision
to make sense.87 A consumer may also want to protect the environment
through altruism and not just their own self-interest.88 Many of these drivers
are not included in current water market regimes.
"In a market economy, prices are essential signals that tell producers and
resource suppliers what and how much to produce."89 When a market goes
out of equilibrium, price is what pulls it back.90 It is the automatic regulator
that manages the balance between supply and demand.9' Prices also serve
to allocate available commodities among competing end users.92 Demand
and price have an inverse relationship. 93 As prices increases, the quantity
demanded falls. 94
"In a perfect market, both buyers and sellers are numerous enough that
no single buyer or seller can influence price. 95 This theory assumes that the
quantity of items available for purchase is only reliant on sellers making the
good available; however, for a resource like water this is not true.96 Not only
is there a fixed quantity of water in the world, events like drought can reduce
the quantity available in a certain region.97 According to economic theory,
these supply reductions would eventually lead to a corresponding price
increase.98
It is often assumed that water demand is fairly inelastic; however, that
is only true of nondiscretionary uses. 99 Discretionary uses, such as lawn
watering or wasteful indoor practices, are more elastic.'00 Although there is
no substitute for water, the user can choose to avoid watering all together or
increase efficiencies to reduce total demand.'0 ' Therefore, price elasticity of
demand for water is only effective on certain types of uses. 0 2 In those areas,
increased price can save a considerable amount of water. 103 In drier
87 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 9.
88 Id.
" Id. at 10.
90 BADE & PARKIN, supra note 59, at 100.
91 Id.
92 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 11.
Id. at 55.
4 Id. at 56. This rle assumes that other things, like income and supply remain constant.
5 Id. at 65.
96 Id.
17 WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 36.
98 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 61-62.
" Jonathan H. Adler, Water Marketing as an Adaptive Response to the Threat of Climate Change, 31
HAmLINE L. REV. 729, 746 (2008); VAN DER ZAAG & SAVENIJE, supra note 40, at 18.
100 Adler, supra note 99, at 746. Outdoor water use can account for over 50% of household use,
particularly in dry regions. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: WATER SENSE, OUTDOOR WATER USE IN THE
UNITED STATES, http://www.epa.gov/WaterSense/pubs/outdoor.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 4 ("In Phoenix, changeovers from turf lawns and
high-water-demand plants to native desert landscaping are shifting water use patterns dramatically.").
1o1 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 125-26.
102 Adler, supra note 99, at 746-47.
10' See id.
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climates, discretionary uses account for over fifty percent of total water
withdrawals during peak month creating a large opportunity to reduce usage
through price triggers.0 4
One important aspect of price accuracy is the inclusion of
externalities. 10 5 An externality "represents a connection between economic
agents which lies outside the price system of the economy. As the level of
externality generated is not controlled directly by price, the standard
efficiency theorems on market equilibrium cannot be applied.' 0 6 There are
many externalities not included in the current price of water including
scarcity, environmental consequences, and water quality degradation, just to
name a few.'0 7 While all of these have both a monetary and a social cost,
those costs are borne outside and unrelated to the market, which artificially
deflates prices.'0 8 Although price can be used to affect demand, this will
only be effective in a property functioning market. Unfortunately, the
current water market may be incapable of sending accurate price signals
3. Flipping the Model: Conserving Too Late
Intrinsic in a working market is the assumption that price moves goods
towards their highest value use and increases overall efficiency. '" The
ultimate goal of a market is to ensure that a good is obtained by the person
who values it the most; however, with water another goal is critical: that
water does not run out."0 The hope is to use markets to effectuate this goal,
but under current conditions price triggers to reduce demand would occur
after the water is gone and it is too late."'
"Water usage is a function of available supply and the value of water."" 2
Value in this quote actually refers to current cost."' The supply curve is
based on the cost of production as well as demand."i4 The least expensive
water is always the first to be used, which keeps prices low. 115 Once that
104 SAM MARIE HERMITTE & ROBERT E. MACE, TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, THE GRASS IS
ALWAYS GREENER... OUTDOOR RESIDENTIAL WATER USE IN TEXAS 4, available at
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/technical-notes/doc/SeasonalWaterUseReport-
final.pdf.
105 RONALD C. GRIFFIN, WATER RESOURCES ECONOMICS: THE ANALYSIS OF SCARCITY, POLICIES, AND
PROJECTS 109 (2006); FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 269.
106 GRIFFIN, supra note 105, at 109.
107 Id. at 216-20; Erin M. Tegtmeier & Michael D. Duffy, External Costs ofAgricultural Production in
the United States, 2 INT'L J. OF AGRIC. SUSTAINABILITY 1, 1-2, 5-14 (2004) (listing many negative
impacts of agricultural production not factored into the price of goods).
108 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, WATER PRICING PRIMER FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION 7
(20 10). See Tegtmeier & Duffy, supra note 107, at 1-2.
109 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 178.
110 Id.
111 Glennon, supra note 18, at 1884-86.
112 TARLOCK, supra note 24, at 14.
113 Id.
114 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 63-64.
115 Glennon, supra note 18, at 1873-74.
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supply is gone, users turn to more expensive water alternatives and the
corresponding cost increases." 6 This increased cost shifts the supply curve
such that the market equilibrium will also move and the price per unit will
increase.117
Increased price can be used to encourage efficient behavior. 118 A
consumer with excess income might be willing to pay for a larger lawn even
at a higher price; however; if price goes up and income stays the same, the
average consumer will decrease their use to accommodate the price
change." 9 The problem with using this model is that, assuming constant
demand; price cannot increase unless supply decreases. 2 °
Water can also be affected by changes in the demand curve. 121 Even if
individual demand is constant, a growth in population can increase overall
market demand. If there is not a corresponding increase in supply, the
price per unit will increase or individual demand will have to decrease to
maintain market equilibrium.1 23 These market scenarios can occur in a
drought, where demand is challenged by a dwindling resource, or by the
long-term problem created when a city grows beyond its current water
resources and must turn to more expensive water options.
The problem with this model is two-fold. First, if the price of basic
water needs goes up and income does not increase, low-income users only
using water for non-discretionary uses will suffer.124 Using the traditional
model, a customer must either pay more or use less if they want their bill to
remain constant after a rate increase. 125 Because water is necessary for
survival, the system fails low-income users because someone without the
means cannot simply live without water. 26 The second problem with this
model is that price will increase only when costs increase, which is too
late. 27 The goal is to affect behavior early enough to avoid new supply, not
to change behavior because new supply is already required.
The existing model is particularly problematic in drought or emergency
conditions because of its slow response to market needs. 28 Traditional rate
116 See, e.g., Barringer, supra note 67 (discussing the price of an expensive desalination plant in
California).
... EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 61-62.
118 See id. at 9.
... FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 125-26.
121 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 61-62.
121 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 82, Figure 3.17.
122 Id.
123 id.
124 Deborah Sullivan Brennan, SD Water Rates to Jump 15 Percent, UT-SAN DIEGO, Nov. 21, 2013,
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Nov/21/enviromnent-water-rate-increase-san-diego/.
125 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 82, Figure 3.17.
126 How Long Can We Survive Without Food or Water? CBC NEWS, May 7, 2011,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/how-long-can-we-survive-without-food-or-water- 1.1000898.
121 EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 63-64.
128 Rogers, supra note 1. BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 44 ("If the resources were not scarce, there would
be no need to "economize" their use by means of a price system.").
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models do not have a mechanism for a rapid adjustment to affect behavior
and scale back demand in emergency situations nor is there a way to affect
price in a proactive manner.'29 Instead, without regulatory drought measures
in place, climate neutral pumping will occur at a time when additional
conservation is especially important, thus depleting important supplies when
they cannot be replaced. 30 This creates an economic inefficiency.
The current business model actually creates a negative feedback loop. 3 '
Price goes up based on scarcity and the need for new expensive technology
signaling people to use less as new supply comes on line.3 2  Financial
commitments to new projects often disincentivize conservation
programming efforts because sale of water is necessary to pay for the
project.'33 This can further increases demand and the need for even more
supply.
The primary mechanism of markets creates the biggest problem that
arises when markets are applied to water. As previously discussed, a market
transfers goods to those who value them the most. 13 4 Intrinsic in this are two
important assumptions. 135 First, that everyone who values water has the
money to purchase it, and two, that people are the only essential recipients
of water. Both are false assumptions. 36 Obviously, every human values
water highly especially for basic needs; however, not everyone can pay for
it at any price. 3 ' An unregulated, open market would punish low-income
users simply because they could not participate in the market allocation of
resources.3 Finally, in other markets, life can continue without the good or
it can be substituted for another, similar good. That is clearly not true here.
An illustration of these concerns can be found in cities across the U.S.
129 See e.g., Missouri Public Service Commission, RATE MAKING PROCESS, available at
http://psc.mo.gov/General/Ratemaking Process (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (describing the arduous
process of changing rates through a rate case).
Rogers, supra note 1.
1 1 See id.
112 Norimitsu Onishi, Arid Australia Sips Seawater, but at a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 10, 2010, at A6,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/world/asia/Ilwater.html? mO.
"' Mark Schliebs, Mothballs at the ready for $1.8bn desal plant, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 27, 2013,
available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/mothballs-at-the-ready-for-
lbn-desal-plant/story-e6frgczx-1226607172584#.
1"4 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 178.
115 See id.
1"6 See id.
117 JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMITH, ET AL., PACIFIC INSTITUTE, ASSESSING WATER AFFORDABILITY A PILOT
STUDY IN TWO REGIONS OF CALIFORNIA (2013), available at http://www.pacinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/21/2013/08/assessing-water-affordability.pdf.
1"8 See id. at 1-2.
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III. THE BROKEN BusINEss MODEL: THE CURRENT WATER UTILITY
LANDSCAPE
As a society, continued prosperity and survival is predicated on a
sustainable water supply. 39 One way to accomplish this goal is to ensure
that water is used wisely and no one uses more than what she needs. Markets
can help achieve this; however, price must be an accurate indicator of value
to be successful. 40 Many argue that markets should not be applied to public
goods like water.' 4' While there are good arguments for that idea, it is highly
unlikely that the United States will stop pricing water. 4 2 In addition, zero
valuation can lead to wasteful usage and result in a tragedy of the
commons. 143
True value of water is not always reflected by market price. 144 Many
items that are not marketed commodities still have an economic value. 1
Price often does not match value because market value changes based on
circumstances. 146 At any given time, market value is dependent on many
factors including supply (permanent and temporary) and demand (time of
year, weather).147 True value is more stable than market value. 148 While a
market system regime is not naturally protective of water resources, policies
can be adjusted to ensure markets incorporate currently absent
considerations to strengthen valuation accuracy.
One of the primary ways people purchase water is through municipal
utility service billing. 149 In this situation, a city provider, or other similar
entity, holds legal access to the water and they disseminate the resource to
their customers for a price. 150 Utilities are organized to be financially self-
139 TARLOCK, supra note 24, at 13, 15.
'
40 Hanemann, supra note 61, at 3. JEFFERY A. HUGHES & SHARLENE LEURIG, ASSESSING WATER
SYSTEM REVENUE RISK: CONSIDERATIONS FOR MARKET ANALYSTS 6 (2013) ("[M]any water systems
are seeing evidence that customers are more price-responsive.").
141 YOUNG, supra note 57, at 89.
142 See id.
143 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/contentl/162/3859/1243.full. Tragedy of the commons is the economic
theory that argues, if permitted to do so, individuals will act independently on a common resource
according to each one's self-interest and deplete the resource contrary to the group's long-term best
interests. Id. FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 59, at 284 ("When a valuable resource has a price of zero,
people will continue to exploit it as long as its marginal benefit remains positive.").
144 Hanemann, supra note 61, at 3. The actual or market price is the price for which an item is sold.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 30 (1776). The
market price can be above, below or at the natural price. Id.




149 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, FUNDAMENTALS OF WATER RATE MAKING 1-3 (2008), available
at http://www.allianceforwaterefficiency.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id720.
1' See e.g., SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM, EDWARDS AQUIFER-PUMPING RIGHTS ACQUISITION,
http://www.saws.org/Your Water/WaterResources/projects/edwards.cfm (last visited Feb 20, 2014).
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sufficient and not require income from other sources such as taxes. 151 They
usually function as a monopoly; therefore, their rates are regulated as a
substitute for open market competition. 1
52
Suppliers are only allowed to earn a reasonable rate of return, so rates
are generally calculated based on their costs. 153  This can create several
problems. First, rates cannot be increased until costs increase, which is often
an indicator of water shortage. 54 Second, under the traditional rate model,
utilities are motivated to sell water, which can actually create the shortage. 155
These perverse market incentives threaten both utility and water
sustainability.
A. Efficiency v. Revenues: A False Conflict
The problem is simple. Water providers are tasked with selling water.156
Utilities cannot stay in business if they do not generate revenues to maintain
their capital-intensive business. 57 In many cases, these revenues also help
to fund city budgets, further incentivizing sales over conservation. 151
Despite this motivation to sell, per capita water consumption revenues have
been trending downward while costs increase. 159 Current water use is
equivalent to the amount used in the 1950s.16 While revenues may be
variable, many costs are not.' 6' The obvious result of these trends is that
more utilities are or will experience financial difficulties. 16 2 Over time, this
movement can affect the utility's self-sufficiency and debt service.'63 In
addition to budget shortfalls, volatile revenue streams create general utility
instability.
164
151 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, DEFINING A RESILIENT BUSINESS MODEL FOR WATER UTILITIES 19
(2014).
152 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 18.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 14.
155 See id.
156 Id. at7.
157 Id. at 7, 11; WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 3 1.
158 See e.g., Rebecca McCutcheon, City Budget Expected to Increase Due to Utility Sales, Sale Tax
Collections, WINFIELD DAILY COURIER, July 31, 2015, available at http://www.winfieldcourier.com/
news/article f5ddf95c-37da-1 1e5-9ef4-fbeaee749e0 i.html.
159 Shadi Eskaf, Trends for Operating Expenses Relative to Operating Revenues for Local Government-
Owned Water Utilities, UNC ENVTL. FINANCE BLOG, May 22, 2013, http://efc.web.unc.edu/2013/05/22
/trends-in-operating-expenses-relative-to-operating-revenues-for-local-govermnent-ownedwater-
utilities/.
160 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at7. WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note
177, at xxv ("Between any given consecutive years between FY2004 and FY2011 revenues decreased
from 14%-37% for a cohort of 485 utilities from across the country.").
161 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 32. Many fixed costs are determined by debt
service payments. Id. at 32-33. When water revenues decrease, the obligation to pay investors who
financed new water projected does not change. Id.
162 Eskaf, supra note 159.
163 Id.
164 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 11.
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The relationship between sales and revenue leads to flashy headlines
concluding that water conversation bankrupts utilities. 165 Fortunately, it is
not that simple. Budget shortfalls are more often the result of bad planning,
not good citizenship. 66 Research shows that uncertainty is the real threat to
utility resilience, not conservation. 167 "The tension between pricing to
encourage less consumption versus pricing to encourage more sales and
more revenue can lead to battles between water system managers and elected
boards, and even within water systems between conservation program
directors and financial directors.' 68
This does not have to be the case. The key, often-forgotten, variable is
that new supply costs money too and may not even be available when
needed. 69 Giving value to existing supply and avoided new supply can shift
the conversation from one of public policy to economics. 70 "The time has
come for the whole industry to shift from a paradigm of growth to a
paradigm of sustainability . . . . Building sustainable utilities is more
important than addressing revenue losses alone.
1. Is Water Conservation Really the Enemy?
The largest source of revenue is costumer sales. 172 The inability to
predict sales accurately leads to variable revenues. While utilities can plan
for some level of uncertainly, a drastic delta between predicted and actual
sales can threaten the business model. 17' The key to reliable revenue
projections is the reduction of uncertainty through conservation not in spite
of it.
In many cities, conservation is only encouraged or required during dry
periods. 74 Although compliance may occur, the pattern reverts in times of
plenty when utilities collect as much revenue as possible and the
conservation ethic is lost.175 This causes problems in the long-term because
165 E.g., Katherine Shaver, Water Utilities Charge More to Offset Low-flow Toilets, Faucets and Shower
Heads, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2014, at Al; Neena Satija, Texans' Water Conservation Reward: Higher
Rates, TEx. TRIBuNE, Feb. 10, 2014.
166 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 3 (contrasting the experiences of Seattle and
Denver to illustrate that a utility can be successful even with declining demand as long as it is built into
the business model).
167 id.
168 Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 10.
169 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 7, 12.
17' Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 16.
171 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 9.
172 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at xxv.
173 id.
174 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 2.
175 Id. Some cities are trying to stop this cycle by permanently adopting drought restrictions reasoning
the community is already accustomed to the practice and it reduces revenue fluctuations. Caty Hirst,
Typical Fort Worth Water and Sewer Bill May Rise $3.31 a Month, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Aug. 21, 2014, at A2.
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the overall availability of water resources is also declining and more supply
may not be available when needed; therefore, consistent nonuse of water is
the best way to ensure its availability.'76
Unfortunately, because effective conservation strategies reduce
revenues, people make the mistaken conclusion that conservation and
efficiency measures are responsible for rising water rates. 177 "In contrast,
money spent on efficiency stabilizes the long-term rates customers pay by
limiting capital expenditures for new treatment facilities, water storage and
transmission capacity.' 78  Attacking conservation creates future conflicts
by not focusing on the relationship consumers need to have with water to
ensure reliability. 79 The real issue causing a financial shortfall is increased
costs, not decreased revenues.'80 Of course, increased costs and conservation
are related in utility financials, but the necessity to update infrastructure can
challenge finances even with stable water sales.' 8 '
The solution is to reexamine the economic model, not vilify
conservation. To achieve economic resilience, utilities need to generate
revenues lost through conservation from other sources or avoid costs.'82
One way cities are attempting to stabilize revenues is to shift a larger portion
of income away from consumption revenue to fixed fees.'83 For example,
Fort Worth, Texas is increasing the percentage of their income from fixed
fees from seventeen to twenty-five percent of their budget.'8 4 This helps
cover the expenses that are not variable, including infrastructure costs
needed to deliver water and treat wastewater. 185 Fixed fees can be increased
in a way that is conservation oriented if they are tied to total use. 186
Utilities need to be cautious to avoid stating that conservation will
reduce bills. 18 7 That may or may not occur.'88 A distinction must be made
between rates and bills."8 9 The reality is that operation and maintenance of
existing systems is becoming more expensive which may maintain bill
amounts; however, conservation can avoid future rate increases.i90 Utilities
176 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 12.
ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 3; E.g., Shaver, supra note 165, at A3.
178 SHARLENE LEURIG, WATER RIPPLES: EXPANDING RISKS FOR U.S. WATER PROVIDERS 13 (2012).
19 Mary Ann Dickinson, The Real Relationship Between Conservation and Rising Water Rates,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 5, 2014, http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/10/05/the-real-
relationship-between-conservation-and-rising-water-rates/.
180 Id.
181 Amy Silverstein, Is Water Conservation Really Bankrupting Texas Cities, or Are They Just Bad at
Planning, DALLAS OBSERVER, Feb. 19, 2014, at Al; Hirst, supra note 175; Dickinson, supra note 179.
182 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 3.
18 Hirst, supra note 175.
184 Id.
115 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 5.
186 Hirst, supra note 175.
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should strive to message the full impact of avoided supply and
infrastructure.' 9' While utility costs may continue to increase based on the
need for infrastructure replacement and upgrades, better decision making
now could decrease the amount of infrastructure cities need to fix in the
future reducing and exponential increase in costs over a time horizon. 92 In
a startling example, a study in Westminster, Colorado showed that
conservation programs implemented in 1980 yielded citizens a whopping
91% savings in rates compared to what they would currently be had the
programs not started. 93 If customers are not educated about this issue, they
may feel as though they are being punished for using less when rates
increase. 194
One of the keys is to consider water saved through conservation as a
type of water supply.i95 "Every gallon saved is water that does not have to
be pumped, treated and delivered - and the saved water can then be allocated
elsewhere to accommodate new growth. ' '196 Supply created through saved
water will most likely cost much less than new supply obtained through
expensive technologies such as desalination or pipeline projects. 19' In Fort
Worth, drops in demand allowed for delays in plant expansions saving the
city $20 million a year in borrowing costs. 198 Once the situation is fully
understood, it is clearly wiser to manage declining demand by designing
191 Id. In Fort Worth, Texas city council attempted to explain to citizens that rate increases were not a
penalty, but a guard against further increases. Hirst, supra note 175.
192 See Leurig, supra note 178, at 9; Dickinson, supra note 179; Shaver, supra note 165, at A3 ("The new
fees would ultimately save customers money by slowing the trajectory of future rate increases."). The
problem is that people rarely want to discuss infrastructure despite its importance. Id. ("The cost of
infrastructure is annoying and boring."); WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 31 ("Rate
increases canbe politically challenging, and many utilities face pressure to delay increasing their charges
for service for as long as possible."). In Fresno, California, where water is already very inexpensive,
residents pushed back on higher rates to fund a new water project that would diversify their water source
and protect the aquifer. Nelson D. Schwartz, Water Pricing in Two Thirsty Cities: In One, Guzlers Pay
More, and Use Less, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2015, at A5. Maintaining existing rates to the detriment of
existing infrastructure has its own price. Cynthia Barnett, It's Time for America to Talk About the Price
of Water, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 7, 2014. In Los Angeles, promises of flat rates created backlash when
an aging pipe broke spilling twenty million gallons of water into the street during a severe drought. Id.
at Al. In fact, many recent rate increases are actually the cumulative result of long-ignored infrastructure.
Id. at A3.
19 Dickinson, supra note 179.
194 Shaver, supra note 165, at A3. ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 6 ("Particularly
vexing is the potential association of efficiency and conservation with higher rates, which can undermine
support for efficiency goals as well as the public's trust.").
195 Dickinson, supra note 179; Silverstein, supra note 181, at A2 (using San Antonio, Texas as an
example of a city who was able to meet financial obligations by categorizing conservation as part of their
supply portfolio).
196 Dickinson, supra note 179.
19 Silverstein, supra note 181, at Al-A2.
198 Brett Walton, Price of Water 2014: Up 6Percent in 30Major U.S. Cities; 33 PercentRise Since 2010,
CIRCLE OF BLUE, May 7, 2014, at A2. ("If the three projects has beenbuilt according to the plan set forth
in 2005, residential water rates today would be 10 percent higher.")..
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water rates that encourage consumers to conserve while collecting revenues
to cover all necessary costs and keep finances stable.' 99
One distinction that often is not made in this discussion is the difference
between conservation or efficiency savings and drought rules. It is
imperative that they not be used interchangeably as the former is far more
predicable than the latter. Long-term efficiency measures should motivate
permanent behavior shifts, creating less reactivity in rates. For example, an
efficient toilet uses over five gallons less water per flush than a traditional
one.200 Therefore, a utility can calculate the approximate savings that will
be yielded from a large-scale replacement program. Drought, on the other
hand, is more difficult to calculate because the extent to which it will affect
revenues is often unknown.
2. The Drought Challenge
During times of drought, water utilities often need to impose water use
restrictions that can severely decrease revenues.20 ' Because no one knows
exactly when drought will hit or how long it will last, utilities are challenged
to effectively plan for the resulting financial penalty.20 2 This does not have
to be the case. Inelastic demand will largely stay the same because, by
definition, it does not change.203 The key to fiscal survival during weather
variations is to truly understand and minimize elastic demand during normal
years.20 4 Once this is accomplished, less variation will occur during drought
restrictions and revenues will be steadier.20 5
Some utilities save in advance for reduced revenue during droughts,
while others charge a drought surcharge to make up the revenue difference
during reduced usage.20 6  In 2014, the water utility in Austin, Texas
proposed a drought fee to recover revenues lost due to once-a-week watering
199 Dickinson, supra note 179.
200 Steve Maxwell, Low-Flow Toilets: Half the Water, Twice the Flush!, MOTHER EARTH NEWS,
Aug./Sept. 2006, available at http://www.motherearthnews.com/green-homes/low-flow-toilets-
zmaz06aszraw.aspx.
21 Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 16.
202 Id.
201 Very extreme drought might fall outside this statement. Drought rules that require shower water to
be used in washing machines or other extreme measures would reduce what is traditionally considered
inelastic or basic demand.
204 Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 19. During the Texas drought of 2011-12, cities that had strong
water efficiency programs experienced more stable demand and revenues thanthose who did not. Leurig,
supra note 178, at 1, 6. Investors are beginning to understand that although water might be a public
good, not all uses are essential. Id. at 4.
205 Interestingly, the same tactic might also be the solution for managing unexpected heavy rainfall when
people no longer feel the necessity to water their lawns. See, e.g., Emily Sides & Sky Chadde, Recent
rainfall cuts into cities' water revenue, THE MONITOR, Jul. 13, 2015, http://www.themonitor.com/
news/locallrecent-rainfall-cuts-into-cities-water- revenue/article 374bac84-29be- 1 le5 -afd-
fb3659dd2120.html.
206 Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 14.
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restrictions necessitated by a prolonged drought. 20 7 The utility argued that
the fee as well as a rate increase was necessary to pay for their extensive
fixed costs. 20 8 Interestingly, in 2014 the city opened a new water treatment
plant capable of treating fifty million gallons per day at a cost of over $350
million.20 9 The controversial plant was approved citing increased demand
and population growth.2 10 It is entirely feasible that the extended Texas
drought would have required similar rate increases, but a different demand
calculation that included increased conservation might have resulted in
avoiding some of the supply costs now encumbering the utility.
While drought will always impact water revenues, the amount of that
impact can be minimized and managed by a utility. The more a utility strives
to manage demand on a daily basis, rather than in reactivity to weather
events, the less volatility will be experienced during times of no or excessive
rain.
2 u
3. The Devil is in the Demand Projections
One of the biggest challenges to ensuring utility resiliency is
uncertainty.2 12 Uncertainty can come in many forms, but perhaps the most
important unknown is how much water will be needed by customers in the
future. Demand projections are used by utilities to determine the design and
operation of their system and new supply needs. 213 Because these decisions
will lead to costs passed on to the customer, accuracy is critical.214
Despite the critical importance of demand projections, many utilities do
not even attempt to calculate them.215 Many others assume that per capita
water use will be the same as that of their current customers.216 These
utilities forecast demand by applying historic use data to population
projections. 217 The accuracy of these numbers is predicated on the
207 Sarah Coppola, Budget Cut, 'Drought Fee'on Utility Agenda, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN Jun.
4, 2014.
208 Id.
209 Ashley Goudeau, Water Treatment Plant 4 Up and Running, KVUE, Dec. 2014, available at
http://www.kvue.com/story/news/local/2014/12/19/water-treatment-plant-4-up-and-running/20640667/.
210 id.
211 Leurig, supra note 178, at 16. fnot financially prepared for drought impacts, cities may be forced to
raise rates during drought essentially punishing users for adhering to drought restrictions. See, e.g.,
Monica Ching, City Council: Water Rates Stable, For Now, SAN ANGELO STANDARD, Feb. 18, 2014
("'If in six months and it doesn't rain, then we may need to look at increasing some rates,' Mayor Dwain
Morrison said.").
212 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 16; Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 3.
211 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 28.
214 Id. Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 15 ("Clearly, one of the defining pricing challenges faced
by utilities is balancing the need for sufficient revenue and stability with demand management goals.").
215 Leurig, supra note 178, at 12-13.
216 Id.
217 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 33; Leurig, supra note 178, at 12-13.
Population estimates can be estimated linearly, as an annual percentage (exponential growth) or can be
more nuanced based on demographer's predictions. PACIFIC INSTITUTE, WATER RATES: WATER
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assumption that water will be used in the future the same way it was used in
the past.218 Not only does this not allow for new technologies and cultural
shifts, it may actively discourage them.219 This can spell financial disaster
for utilities. 22 Consumers do not use water in the same way they did fifteen
to twenty years ago; so, it is logical to assume that their relationship to water
will continue to evolve. 221 Simply ignoring this natural progression, or
worse, not attempting to generate that shift can lead to expensive,
unnecessary capital expenditures.222
A recent example of this problem occurred in Seattle, Washington.223
There, a suburban water agency openly admits that they misinterpreted
future demand leading to negative financial consequences. 224 Forecasting
that residents would require more water, the agency entered into a
contractual agreement for water supplies at a premium price. 2 25 Contrary to
their assumptions, per capita water use in the area actually declined twenty
to fifty percent as a result of more efficient usage, price increase, weather
patterns and code changes.226 Accurate demand projections would have
prevented this expensive mistake.227
Demand is not static. 2 28 Weather is less and less predictable throughout
the U.S., which can greatly affect water resources.229 Predicting growth and
how people will use the water is also a challenge. 23" Therefore, the process
of forecasting demand should be iterative rather than linear to allow for
adjustments based on price and other factors.231 Demand forecasting should
move away from point projections towards risk modeling that includes a
range of factors including population, pricing, climate, elastic uses and new
DEMAND FORECASTING 1, http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/water rates water demand
forecasting.pdf.
218 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 3 ("Past methods of straight-line extrapolation
of per-capita consumption are no longer valid."); PACIFIC INSTITUTE, supra note 217, at 1.
219 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 3.
221 Id. See Leurig, supra note 178, at 12-13. The amount to which inaccurate demand projections will
affect the utility bottom line depends on the extent rates are tied to consumption. PACIFIC INSTITUTE,
supra note 217, at 2.
22' Leurig, supra note 178, at 11.
222 Id. at 13.




228 Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 5. Overall per capita usage has dropped due to more efficient
appliance technology, better plumbing standards, and conservation programs; however, land use patterns
such as new developments with irrigation systems mean that new homes often use more water than old
housing stock. Id.
229 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 16.
2 01d. Advanced metering is an important tool for accurate demand projections. ALLIANCE FOR WATER
EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 3. Although expensive, smart meters may ultimately save money by
providing critical use information to utilities. Id. at 3.
211 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 28.
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regulations. 23 2 Experts agree that it is time to rethink the utility business
model and understanding demand must be at the heart of that change.233
The timelines of demand projections and system design are not always
the same.234 While a utility might be planning on a fifty-year horizon,
demand might be impacted by short-term events like extreme weather
variability or economic changes. 23 5  "Long-term forecasting is typically
more useful for infrastructure and capital planning whereas short-term
forecasts are more useful for setting water rates. 236 Water rates are only set
every few years so agencies need to be able to anticipate future needs.237
"Regulatory lag [] is a well-known and understood problem- and, in fact,
valuable in controlling monopolistic effects- but not one that is readily
manageable. To put lag into operational terms, it is not uncommon for two
years to pass from the completion of a cost design to actual revenue
collection. 
238
Many permanent water supplies are procured for limited periods of peak
demand, which often occur during the hottest portions of the summer
months.2 39 Managing these peak needs can avoid supply costs and level out
revenue volatility. 240 "Better pricing can help utilities shift "load" and
improve capacity utilization by smoothing out the peaks and valleys of usage
over time .j241 Peak shaving has been very successful in the energy industry
by avoiding expressive new power plants that are only necessary on the
hottest days of the year. 242 Properly understanding demand and the
212 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, SALES FORECASTING AND RATE MODEL, App. B 4 (Aug. 2014)
(providing sample formulas for complex modeling); ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15,
at 9; PACIFIC INSTITUTE, supra note 217, at 1; Hughes, Rate Structures Don't Kill Budgets, Inaccurate
Projections Do, UNC ENVTL. FINANCE BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://efc.web.unc.edu/ 2012/10/09/rate-
stmctures-dont-kill-budgets-inaccurate-projections-do/. Id. ("At the end of the day its [sic] just math,
albeit somewhat complicated math given some of the complicated rate structures many utilities have
adopted."). Id.
233 See generally ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15.
234 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 31. Short-term costs include expenditures such
as costs related to amount of water processed, treated and delivered that do vary and other short-terms
costs that do not vary. Long-term costs include labor and capital costs for new infrastructure usually
vary on the long-term horizon. Id. at 31-32.
235 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 28. Another complicating and conflicting
timeline is that of politics. Barnett, supra note 192. Short-term office holders do not want to be
responsible for rate increases to fix infrastructure when benefits may be realized until long after their
term is complete. Much of the skyrocketing costs we currently see are actually the result of ignored
infrastructure. Id.
236 PACIFIC INSTITUTE, supra note 217, at 1.
237 Id.
238 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 4.
239 Id. at 3.
240 Id.
241 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 8.
242 THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE 3, 48-
49 (2011), http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP Lazar ElectricityRegulationInTheUS Guide
2011 03.pdf. The peak period for energy usage is usually in the early morning and just after work on
very hot or very cold days depending on the area of the country. Id. The equivalent for water is usually
during very hot months, when outdoor irrigation demand spikes. Passing along these costs to consumers
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reduction of elasticity can prevent a utility from making unnecessary capital
investments and increase revenue resilience.243
B. Cost of Service & Reasonableness Limitations
Water utilities have the daunting responsibility to ensure water is
available for customers not just today, but into the future.244 Part of meeting
that requirement involves the obligation to recover their costs. 245
"Traditional water utility financing focused on generating sufficient revenue
to enable construction of the required water infrastructure and to fund
operations and maintenance expenses under forecasts of steadily increasing
water demand and known and stable costs., 246 These systems of continuing
to build infrastructure and passing along the costs to the growing customer
base has become more complex as water supply alternatives diminish and
growth exceeds expectations. 247
Utilities are essentially monopolies. 248 They are the only available
seller in a given market with the power to control price and supply. 249
Because they provide essential services without competition, pricing must
be managed. 25  Although, utilities set their own rates, statutory obligations
often limit what utilities can charge.' In addition to cost recuperation, rates
for services rendered are also limited by due process and equal protection
captures the marginal cost of that unit of product in an effort to send a price signal and either collect more
revenue for that product or shave that peak demand. Id. at 47-48.
24 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at xxix.
244 SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE 4 (2013).
245 Id. at 14. Part of the "reasonableness" determination is whether current rates allow the utility to
perform the functions assigned to it by law. BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 41.
246 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 14. Cost of service is also used to cover the
costs of financing these projects, which is a critical component to planning new infrastructure and supply
projects. HUGHES &LEURIG, supra note 140, at 9. It is also important for the utility's ability to pay back
bonds to finance past projects. See id. at 9. Increased revenue volatility can affect debt service and utility
bond ratings. Id. Fort Worth's bond rating was reduced citing reduced water sales. Silverstein, supra
note 181.
247 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 14-15.
248 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 18; HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 14. There
are some examples of utility deregulation and migration away from the monopoly model, but this has
been more on the electric side and is unusual for water providers. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, supra note 242, at 3-4, 8; HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 70-71.
249 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 11.
250 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 8-9 (distinguishing necessary utility services from luxuries or mere
conveniences).
251 Id. at 34; HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 5. "Utilities have the substantive right to charge rates that
provide a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return ...." Id. Because necessity was recognized,
government regulation was supported even when other types of government interference with business
was disfavored. BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 8. Public utility status and pricing regulations act as a
substitute for open market competition. Id. at 10.
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considerations.252 Charges for services are limited to 'lust and reasonable"
and must be done in an equitable and nondiscriminatory way.253
Utility revenue is primarily generated to pay basic costs associated with
service, including infrastructure capital costs, staff, operation and
maintenance etc. 254 These are often referred to as cost of service. Because
each of these inputs have variability, estimating future needs based on
professional judgments can be a difficult, creating further challenges to
different approaches to rate design. 255 "At the heart of the issue is the
inherent mismatch between the largely fixed cost structure of drinking water
service providers and the highly variable revenues they receive, which
depend largely on the amount of water their customers use. "256
Because cost of service is cost based, it is largely reactive. In addition
to recovering past costs, the only future costs included are for projects
planned in the immediate future, which are often motivated by over usage
of existing sources. These limitations may prohibit critical price signals
when they are needed.257 The threat of scarcity will not be included until it
has arrived creating problems with ongoing supply needs and resulting in
higher costs on the long-term. Ideally, prices should help optimize when
new supply and infrastructure are built.
258
While cost of service is the tool used by most utilities, the legal
obligation for rates is the broader requirement of reasonableness. 259
Generally speaking, a prudence review of a utility's costs requires that
imprudent costs be disallowed in a cost of service revenue rates recovery
paradigm. 260  Rates that greatly exceed costs are open to accusations of
"unreasonableness.1 261 This could be interpreted to mean that a water utility
is obligated to procure the lower cost water and pass those costs through low
rates. Unfortunately, low rates do not create a price signal to users to
encourage efficiency. Courts have also interpreted that the prudence
responsibility should also "secure efficiency in the allocation of
252 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 214. While these are often seen as separate obligations, lack of
discrimination or preference among consumers is arguably an extension of the reasonable pricing
requirement. BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 33.
253 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 219. Nondiscriminatory rates require that similarly situated customers
be treated similarly. Id. at 288-89.
254 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 19. "Public utility companies are permitted to
impose charges for their services largely in order to induce and enable them to supply these services...
and for their required expansion." BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 49-50.
255 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 34. Utilities must project both fixed and
variable costs. Id. at 35.
256 HUGHES & LEURIG, supra note 140, at 3.
251 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 18.
258 R. Quentin Grafton et al., Optimal Water Tariffs and Supply Augmentation for Cost-of-Service 34
UTILS. POL'Y 54, 54 (2015).
259 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 50.
260 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 235-36.
261 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 67.
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resources. '62 These seemingly at-odds requirements appear to create a
conundrum for utilities.
In addition to recouping costs, reasonable rates can include a return on
investment to ensure a good credit rating.263 Good credit is critical for a
utility to procure new capital for future projects. 264  Key in this is the
understanding that utilities are not only obligated to provide service in the
short term, but must continue to serve the community in the future as well.
2 65
Reasonable rates do not necessarily dictate the lowest rates needed to meet
a utility's obligations.26 6 There are other functions that rates can serve
including affecting customer behavior and encouraging efficiency.267
Lack of competition can provide a lack of incentivization for "efficiency
in the allocation of resources. 2 68 To counteract this, the principal of
prudence evolved, acting as a substitute for competitive market forces. 269 "If
a competitive enterprise tried to impose on its customers costs from
imprudent actions, the customers could take their business to a more
efficient provider. A utility's ratepayers have no such choice. A utility's
motivation to act prudently arises from the prospect that imprudent costs
may be disallowed. 270 Costs that might be deemed imprudent include those
that cause an unreasonable increase the revenue requirement. 271 Utilities
that seek cost recovery through rates must choose the most reasonable cost
alternative 272
Similarly, the lack of competition inhibits the price signal to the user to
encourage efficient use. 273 In an unregulated market, price will adjust itself
automatically based on consumer decision-making and consumption. 274 In
a regulated monopoly no such response occurs. 275 Instead, this price
adjustment must be the function of rate regulations.27 6 The challenge in this
system is determining the appropriate price of future costs.
27 7
262 Mfidwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co., 36 FPC 61, 70 (1966).
263 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 50.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 52. "Just and reasonable" represents a zone of permissible rates not a fixed point. HEMPLING,
supra note 244, at 220.
267 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 50-51. The hope is that pricing can be used to force customers to self-
ration to avoid the necessity for required limits on consumption. Id. at 55. In a system where a utility
provides a free or very inexpensive product, waste is likely to occur forcing the utility to choose between
imposing use restrictions or price the product. Id. at 55-56. Allowing people to choose how much they
want or need to use subject to the obligation to pay gives consumers sovereignty. Id. at 57.
268 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 235.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 236.
272 Id.
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C. Water Rates 101
Utilities are designed to be stand-alone financial entities. 278 Because
they do not receive money through taxation or other sources, sufficient
revenues must be generated to remain financially solvent. 2 79  Total revenues
are the result of rate levels and rate structures. 280 There are many
characteristics of an ideal rate structure. 281 The two most germane here are:
1) revenue stability and 2) rate blocks that discourage waste.282
Operating revenues are often made through two primary sources. 283 The
first is consumption-based rates.284 This is the most significant source of
income. 2 15 Although some amount can be predicted, these revenues vary
because they are based on consumer usage.286 The other, less variable,
major revenue source is fees. 28 7 These can be assessed for a number of
things including one-time connection charges, monthly service charges, late
payment penalties, and drought surcharges. 28 8 Larger utilities may also gain
income from practices not associated with operation such as interests and
dividends on property, property sales, rental payments, or possibly power
generation.28 9
Accurate rates and rate structures are critical for utility health and
longevity.290 In addition to generating revenues to pay for expenses, rates
also need to create a price signal for the customer about supply.291 The goal
is to ensure that the price signal creates a balance between efficient use and
utility reliability.292 Effective ratemaking is the cornerstone to balancing
financial stability while encouraging the efficient use of water. 293 "Water
218 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 19.
279 Id.
211 CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES.: THEORY & PRACTICE 409-11
(1988). Rate structure is the assemblage of fees and volumetric charges. Id. Rate level is the magnitude
of each item within the rate structure. Id.
281 id.
282 Id. (citing BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 291 (listing eight criteria for an effective rate structure)).
28 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 20, 22. Revenues are also generated for
wastewater collection, but that will not be included in this conversation.
284 Id. at 20. Most utilities charge different rates for different customer categories including commercial,
industrial and residential. HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 219. This section focuses on generalities of rate
structures while recognizing there can be some variation based on use class.
285 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 20. Customer sales usually comprise ninety
percent of total operating revenues. Id.
286 Id. at 20, 22. "By nature, variable revenue is more vulnerable to fluctuations from year-to-year." Id.
at 24.
287 Id. at 20, 22.
288 Id. at 20.
289 Id.
29 Id. at43.
291 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151; Id. at 44.
292 See id.
293 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 14.
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ratemaking defines where the rubber meets the road between water supply
and water demand. 29
4
Traditionally, the ratemaking process involved three steps. First, utility
revenue requirements must be established.295 These costs are then allocated
to different classes of customers including residential, commercial and
sometimes industrial.296 Finally, rate systems are created to recover the costs
identified in the first step. 297 In addition to per-unit consumed charges, fixed
charges may also be incurred such as a meter charge. 298 The purpose of this
charge is to pay for the utility's fixed charges that do not change based on
use. 299  Ratepayers may also incur a demand charge that reflects each
customer's cost of meeting peak demand.00
1. Consumption Based Rate Structures
In a non-competitive market, utilities function as monopolies.3 ' As
such, a utility is legally limited in its ability to generate revenue by its
costs.30 2 They have the right to only charge 'lust and reasonable" rates that
"provide a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return." 30 3 Ideally, prices
meet the obligation of compensating the seller for their services while
inducing efficient use of the resource.104 "Water efficiency and careful
ratemaking are tolls that help utilities meet [] levels of service and improve
prospects for a financially sustainable future."305
City dwellers might think that water already has a price because they
receive a monthly water bill; however, they are often not paying for the water
itself 306 Instead, utilities bill for the infrastructure's capital and operating
costs.30 7 Because there are traditionally no costs associated with the actual
294 Id. at 17.295 Id. at 27.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 218. In Shoreline, Washington, rates include usage charges. These
one-time fixed fees are paid at the time of connection or equipment installation. City of Shoreline,
Utilities Rates and Charges Assessment Report, http://www.cityofshoreline.com/home/showdocument?
id-17926.
299 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 218.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 14.
302 Id. at 5, 2 16.
303 Id. at 5. "Just and reasonable" does not have fixed meaning, but the goal of pricing should be fairness
to the buyer and supplier of the good. Id. at 219-20. Rather than a particular price point, there is a zone
of reasonableness. Id. at 232.
304 Id. at7.
305 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 14.
306 Glennon, supra note 21, at 337, 340.
307 Glennon, supra note 18, at 1883. This is known as cost of service and what costs canbe passed on to
ratepayers is limited and defined by the state government code. Id.; GRIFFIN, supra note 105, at 255; see,
e.g, TEX. WATER & UTIL. ANN. § 572.061 (West 2014).
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water, overall prices have been kept low.30 8 A fact that is likely to change
in future.30 9
The vast majority of rates are based on consumption.310 Within this
category, municipal rate structures can vary considerably.3 1' While some
charge a price regardless of use, others seek to penalize high volume users
by charging more based on usage.3 12 "The most common method of naming
and distinguishing rate structure relies on how the variable charge changes
as a customer uses more water."313 Traditionally, utilities charged uniform
rates. 314 These flat rate structures assigned a price per user regardless of
amount used.3 15 Every user paid the same monthly amount.3 16 This created
a predictable income for the utility; however, it often did not match true price
to value or provide price signals to users based on their usage.317 These rate
systems often led to wasteful behavior because variations in consumption
were ignored.318 Subsequently, this system was replaced by tiered rates. Flat
fees can also be coupled with usage fees that vary based on amount used.319
Another type of rate system is uniform volumetric rates.320 Unlike flat
fees, this system charges based on the level of use; however, the price per
volume of water is the same regardless of overall use. 32 1 In this system,
users pay more for higher use, but the price increase is proportionally equal
... Glennon, supra note 18, at 1883. Because water rates are based on cost of service they can be highly
variable depending on local conditions. Walton, supra note 224. For some cities, paying for water use
is a new concept. Gene Haagenson, Nearly All Fresno Homes Now Have Metered Water, ABC NEWS -
FRESNO (Dec. 27, 2012), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?id-8934000. For example, in Fresno,
California controversial legislation required the installation of water meters. Id. Even in cities where
water meters are the norm, multifamily units are often not individually metered giving residents no way
to measure their monthly usage. Alexis C. Madrigal, The Simple Gadget That Could Slash Apartment
Buildings' Water Use, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2011/1 i/the-simple-gadget-that-could-slash-apartment-buildings-water-
use/247965/. Extreme drought in California focused the conversation on the mismatch between value
and price of water. Barnett, supra note 192.
... Glennon, supra note 18, at 1883.
.10 See e.g., Hirst, supra note 175 (discussing the city's efforts to shift more revenue to fixed charges).
... Kristina Donnelly & Dr. Juliet Christian-Smith, An Overview of the "New Normal" and Water Rate
Basics, PACIFIC INSTITUTE, June 2013, at 7-10, available at http://www.pacinst.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/pacinst-new-normal-and-water-rate-basics.pdf.
.1 Id. at 7-9.
... HUGHES LEURIG, supra note 166, at 10.
... Phillips, supra note 280, at 428.
115 Donnelly & Christian-Smith, supra note 311, at 7.
316 id.
311 See id.
318 PHILLIPS, supra note 280, at 428.
319 DONNELLY & CHRISTIAN-SMITH, supra note 311, at 7.
320 Id. at 8. While many cities have moved away from this system some places have maintained this
antiquated system in order to have more predictable revenue. An ironic example of this is Fresno,
California, which charges a flat amount per hundred cubic feet. FRESNO MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES, WATER UTILITY FINANCIAL PLAN AND RATES STUDY 1-3 (2015),
www.fresno.gov/NR/rdonlyres/ ... /fno 2015 wtr rpt fll.pdf. While some critics praise the state's
drought preparedness, a closer look reveals additional conservation measures are needed. Charles
Fishman, Op-Ed., How California is Winning the Drought, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015).
321 DONNELLY & CHRISTIAN-SMITH, supra note 311, at 8.
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to the increase in gallons.322 This system is problematic in that it does not
charge differently for discretionary and non-discretionary uses.3 23 While
every household may need a certain quantity of water at an affordable rate,
quantities above this should cost more if a price signal to minimize waste is
desired.324
An increasingly popular system is block or tiered rates. 325  In this
system, the unit price changes according to level of use.3 26 Blocks can be
decreasing or increasing; however, decreasing block structures actually
reward high water users.327 In contrast, increasing block rates charge higher
prices for higher use, while still allowing water for basic needs to be
available at a low rate.328 There is no set number, size, or configuration of
the rate blocks required. 329 The utility can determine the appropriate
quantity of the first, least expensive block and the steepness of the block
increase.330 Ideally the first block is for necessary indoor use and subsequent
blocks are for increasing amounts of outdoor or other discretionary uses.33'
When structured appropriately, these rates can be punitive to the small
percentage of high discretionary water users and encourage conservation
based on price signals.332
There is a tremendous amount of variability possible in inclining rate
structures in how fixed costs are apportioned, number and steepness of
tiers.333 The goal is to design block sizes to target how different classes of
customers value the service.33 4  In addition, the increasing need for a
conservation price signal can create punitive prices for high volume users.
The difficulty is determining how steep of an increased cost is steep enough
to affect behavior.
Another benefit of tiered pricing is that it avoids further regulation and
government intervention. If someone wants to use a higher quantity of




325 Id. at 8-9. A recent survey completed by the Alliance for Water Efficiency revealed that, of the
utilities examined, 82% implemented either decreasing block structures or uniform rates. ALLIANCE FOR
WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 107, at 10. Only 18% use increase-block rates. Id.
326 DONNELLY & CHRISTIAN-SMITH, supra note 311, at 8-9.
321 Id.; Griffin, supra note 105, at 246-247. Decreasing or declining rates systems have a block system
in which higher tier blocks are actually less expensive that the base tiers, thus rewarding wasteful
behavior. PHILLIPS, supra note 280, at 766, 771. These structures are also not reflective of current cost
of service models because utilities do not experience decreasing unit costs with increased usage. Id. at
771.
328 DONNELLY & CHRISTIAN-SMITH, supra note 311, at 8-9.
329 Id.
331 Id. The steeper the block increase, the more punitive it is to high end users. Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.; GRIFFIN, supra note 105, at 247.
333 Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 15.
334 PHILLIPS, supra note 280, at 428.
335 Schwartz, supra note 192.
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steep tiers with the highest users paying three to four times more per gallon
than those in the base tiers.336 Implementation of this rate structure reduced
consumption by twenty percent even as population increased ten percent.337
Currently, conditions such as scarcity, environmental protection, and
time of year are not built into prices. Water is inexpensive where supply is
plentiful or infrastructure is inexpensive regardless of what the future
portends. 338 As water becomes scarcer necessitating increased
infrastructure, technology costs, or water purchases, prices will increase
accordingly. 339
2. Fees and Pass-Through Costs
Most utility costs are fixed. This is why variations in revenue threaten
business model stability. "Because the majority of systems' costs are fixed,
declines in customer use typically require systems to increase the rates they
charge.1 340  "According to a recent survey by the American Water Works
Association 70% of water utilities are not fully recovering their costs."1341
Yet, as systems increase, the price charged per unit of water is less. To make
up for lost revenue, the water system needs to increase the cost of service;
however, the amount a water system increases its rates may not be
proportionate to the revenue increase it experiences.
As discussed, steep increasing tiered rate structures can provide more
affordability to low-use customers and send a better price signal. However,
they also result in volatile revenues for the utility, particularly during
extreme weather patterns. 34 2 "[I]ncreasing block rate structures lead to feast
or famine years" if not coupled with predictable income.343 One solution to
this disconnect is the addition of fixed fees to generate a more dependable
revenue stream.344 Fees are allocated on a per-customer basis and not a per-
unit consumed basis. 345
Many systems employ a two-part system that includes a low base charge
and a variable volumetric charge based on consumption.346 One benefit of
336 id.
331Id. Per capita usage went from 140 gallons a day in 2001 to about 100 gallons a day. Id. Tiered
structures were paired with generous conservation rebate programs to encourage in-home efficiency
retrofits. Id. The conservation success also shows that the community appreciates the need to protect
precious water resources. Id.
33' Hanemann, supra note 61, at 19.
33' Glennon, supra note 18, at 1900; Donnelly & Christian-Smith, supra note 310, at 2-6.
3" Leurig, supra note 150, at 12.
311 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 8.
342 Id. at3.
343 Hughes, supra note 232. "A back of the envelope calculation can show that potential weather swings
can lead to 5-10% revenue swings for many utilities." Id.
344 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 32.
345 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 218.
346 HUGHES & LEURIG, supra note 140, at 10.
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increasing flat fees is revenues are better matched to flat costs.347 Although
fees can help stabilize revenues, there are some drawbacks. First, high
service charges can punish low-income and low-use customers because
higher unit costs are only partially tied to amount used.348 Second, because
these costs are not tied to use, the price signal present in progressive rates
can be lost.3 4 9
Fees partially decouple revenues from usage so there is no longer an
incentive for utilities to encourage sales to generate money. 350 This concept
has been adopted by many energy utilities, but could be easily adopted by
351water providers, as they are increasingly motivated to reduce usage.
Because income generated by fees is revenue, it is governed by the same
legal obligation of reasonableness. 2
Although there are several methods of decoupling, the customer's bill is
never fully decoupled from consumption.353  In addition to stabilizing
revenues, decoupling also gives utilities more flexibility and avoids frequent
rate cases, which can be expensive and time consuming delaying price
reactivity. 354 Decoupling and flat fees are not without their critics. If not
properly deployed, fees can reduce a utility's incentive to keep costs low
because they know a certain revenue stream is guaranteed.355 However,
limited decoupling in concert with conservation-based rated structures can
help stabilize revenues while maintaining a consumption-based price
signal 356
For example, a water district in Southern California implemented a steep
tier structure that successfully reduced the top tier of users by 50%. 35' The
structure included a 500% price increase between the lowest and highest use






50 NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, DECOUPLING POLICIES: OPTIONS TO
ENCOURAGE ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES FOR UTILITIES 1 (2009).
351 See id.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 4. Decoupling can be applied to all or only a portion of sales variations to make up for revenue
shortfalls. Id. "Decoupling begins with a general rate case .... Thereafter, rates are adjusted periodically
to ensure that the utility is actually collecting the allowed amount of revenue, even if sales have varied
from the assumptions used when the previous general rate case was decided. If sales decline below the
level assumed, rates increase slightly, and vice-versa." THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra
note 242, at 61.
3
54 NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, supra note 350, at 1-2; MARY TIGER ET AL., UNC
ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER, DESIGNING WATER RATE STRUCTURES FOR CONSERVATION & REVENUE
STABILITY 11 (2014).
355 Lino Mendiola, The Erosion of Traditional Ratemaking Through the Use of Special Rates, Riders,
and Other Mechanisms, 10 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 173, 180-81, 184 (2008).
356 NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, supra note 350, at 4-5; ALLIANCE FOR WATER
EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 9. "In general, the higher the percent of residential water bill that is
"fixed", the weaker the conservation signal and stronger the revenue stability." TIGER ET AL., supra note
354, at 16 (emphasis omitted).
357 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 7.
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tiers.3 58 Despite a total water demand decline of 30% over five years, the
utility was able to maintain full cost recovery by funding fixed costs through
fixed revenues and appropriately tiered rates.359
Flat fees can be applied for several purposes. A connection charge is a
common example. A new customer pays this one-time fee based on the size
of the meter connection. 360 Another example of a flat fee is a pass-through
that occurs when new equipment such as a meter is installed. 361 Service fees
are also common. Service is a broad term that can include activities such as
meter reading, billing, or other costs that would the same for each
customer.362 Utilities can also pass through costs that are equal for each
user.363 These are particularly useful to for environmental protections such
as habitat protection costs. 36 4
Drought surcharges also qualify as possible flat fees. 365 These are
similar to the fuel fees that were common when gasoline prices
skyrocketed.366 The purpose of these charges is to account for a temporary
cost burden and send an immediate price signal while maintaining
3671 a ermvdwe hunderlying service pricing. These fees can be removed when thetemporary impediment, such as drought, ends.368
D. Who pays? New Growth, Existing Ratepayers & Low Income Users
Although cost of service studies are predicated on the notion that those
for whom costs are incurred should pay, this is usually done at a macro
level.369 All ratepayers pay for new infrastructure and even though new
residents primarily drive increased demand. While it can be argued that
existing citizens benefit from growth, increasingly expensive supply can put
an unfair burden on existing ratepayers.
While utilities are required to avoid undue discrimination across user
groups and avoid subsidies, the persistent increase of utility pricing
necessitates a focus on low-income users. Rate structure design and raising
358 Id.
359 Id.
36 CITY OF SHORELINE, supra note 298, at 1-2; FRESNO MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note
345, at 1-3.
361 CITY OF SHORELINE, supra note 298, at 1.
362 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 40.
363 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 212.
364 Id.
365 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 21, 25.




369 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 36.
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rates must include protection of low-income users.37 ° Expansion of water
services may have the goal of encouraging economic development;
however, this should not be done at the cost of existing rate-payers who may
be priced out of basic services.37 ' "We subsidize water for the largest users
in the United States, including agriculture and energy plants, yet we do not
ensure a basic amount of water for the poorest citizens. 372
Recognizing affordability needs does not imply a requirement that
service rates need to be excessively inexpensive or free.373 Such a system
would require significant cost subsidization.3 74 "If the prices chargeable for
all necessities were to be based on the standards of ability to pay rather than
on standards of cost pricing, then a reorganization of the country's entire
price system would be in order.13 75 However, the importance of water does
necessitate some affordability adjustments.
"Since 2007, city water prices have risen at rates faster than the overall
cost of living. 3 76 The price of water increased thirty-three percent since
2010. 3 77 In 2014 alone, the price increased six percent.3 78 This trend is
expected to continue because of projected infrastructure and supply
projects. 3 79  While high-priced top tier rates can promote conservation
through price, it also can increase revenue volatility.38 Utilities may be
tempted to increase the costs of the lowest tiers, which usually represent
quantities needed for nondiscretionary uses.38' As such, they create a stable
income stream.382 Unfortunately, this can force low-income users to decide
between water and other essentials.
There are several alternatives to protect low-income users. Lifeline rates
allow those who qualify to get a basic amount of water at a special rate383
The usefulness of these often depends on the complexity of the application
system and who can qualify. Other utilities use bill payment assistance for
... Walton, supra note 198. Milford, Massachusetts proposed an 82% rate increase to fund a new water
treatment plant. Matt Harris & Peiffer Brandt, Rates Flood: Rising Water Bills, UNC ENVTL. FIN. BLOG
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://efc.web.unc.edu/2012/10/23/rates-flood-rising-water-bills/.
"' ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 30.
112 Barnett, supra note 192.
373 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 9.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Barnett, supra note 192. Despite these increases, the water sector says will not be enough to cover
the $1 trillion needed for repair and growth. Id. Much of that is likely to come from ratepayers. Id.
377 Walton, supra note 198. This is the equivalent of a $45 bill increasing by $15. Id. Some cities have
seen a much greater increase. Id.
378 Id.
379Id. It is expected that the annual increase in revenue will exceed the Consumer Price Index by double
to fund utilities. Id.
311 Walton, supra note 198.
381 See id.
382 See id.
383 Stacey Isaac Berahzer, The Increasing Need to Address Customer Affordability, UNC ENVTL. FIN.
BLOG (May, 29, 2012), http://efc.web.unc.edu/2012/05/29/the-increasing-need-to-address-customer-
affordability/.
Vol. 15:1
PUT YOUR MONEY WHERE YOUR WATER IS
low-income users. 384 A utility can assist the user in reducing water use
through affordability programs services provided by the utility.38 5 This is
similar to the weatherization programs in the energy sector. Often, it is the
generosity of others that end up protecting at-risk users. 3 6 Utilities can
apply for grants or offer donation opportunities to allow other ratepayers to
donate towards the bills of those who cannot pay.387 While this is very
generous, it may not be reliable for the long term particularly as rates
continue to rise.
One challenge of affordability alternatives can be state law. In many
states, rate revenues cannot be used to finance assistance programs. 38  For
example, in North Carolina water utility revenues cannot be used for the
administration of support programs. 38 9 This essentially carves these costs
out of cost of service costs that can be recovered from ratepayers. 390  As
prices rise, legal changes may need to be made to protect low-income users.
Another alternative to reduce the financial load on existing ratepayers is
the use of impact fees. "Impact fees are payments required by local
governments of new development for the purpose of providing new or
expanded public capital facilities required to serve that development.- 391
These one-time fees pass along the cost of new infrastructure to the people
who will most benefit from the expansion. Traditionally, impact fees took
the form of exactions and were often limited to specific in-kind, on-site
capital costs, but some states have expanded them to include off-site
infrastructure needs as well. 393
State law limits costs that can be included and the total amount of impact
fees possible.39 4 Fees are often limited to capital improvement costs and are
capped at a percentage of the total.395 As such, conventional water supplies
typically did not fall within the permissible statutory definition. However,
as existing water supplies become depleted, dependence on new, expensive






3" Berahzer supra note 383.
390 Id.
391 AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, POLICY GUIDE ON IMPACT FEES (1997),
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/pdf/impactfees.pdf.
392 Arthur C. Nelson & Mitch Moody, Paying for Prosperity: Impact Fees and Job Growth, The
Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, vi (June 2003), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2003/6/metropolitanpolicy-
nelson/nelsonimpactfees.pdf.
393 Id. at 1.
314 See e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 395.012 & 395.015 (West 2014).
315 See e.g., id. In addition to capital costs, an important inclusion is projected interest charges and other
finance costs. Id. at §395.012(b). This is very important for cities who are constructing project with
bonds and can add up to a lot of money that ratepayers will not have to pay. Id.
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demands, which are appropriate for impact fees. Expanding orjust applying
permissible impact fees can be an effective way to both encourage smart
growth and alleviate the cost impact of new supply on existing users,
particularly those on a limited income.
396
IV. UTILITY PRICING FOR EQUITY AND RESILIENCE
Water is a critical resource necessary for both survival and economic
success. To achieve these, water supplies must be sustainable into the future.
While current legal regimes seek to achieve these goals, the focus on revenue
collection often threatens the ability to ensure water is used most efficiently.
Sale of water can actually create a disincentive to protect water resources,
which can have long-term consequences. Applied properly, markets can be
used to prevent these concerns. Upon closer examination, there is a false
conflict between sales and resource protection. Shifting away from the
traditional utility demand projections and billing models allow utilities to
stay in business and help maintain water supply into the future.
A. Expand Cost of Service
Perhaps the most frequent water transaction is the sale of water from a
water utility to a municipal domestic and commercial user.397 In the U.S.,
over three hundred million customers receive their water from a utility.
398
This provides a huge opportunity to affect behavior through price and an
equally large chance that water is being used inefficiently. Proper rate
structures can send appropriate signals to users to minimize wasteful
behavior particularly for discretionary needs.399 When low rates are the only
price signal received by millions of city dwellers, there is no incentive to
conserve until it is too late.400 This is not an effective use of markets to
ensure product efficiency. In order to provide an effective price signal,
limitations on what costs a utility can pass through to ratepayers must be
expanded from the current alternatives.40 '
Currently, rates are determined based on a limited cost of service
analysis. 402 Depending on the jurisdiction, rates can only be used to recoup
.96 Nelson & Moody, supra note 392. at vi, 2. See e.g., Amy Hardberger, SA WS Impact Fees Represent
More Than Meets the Eye, THE RIVARD REPORT (May 22, 2014), http://therivardreport.com/impact-fees-
represent-meets-eye/ (discussing the recent impact fees debate in San Antonio, where the primary issue
was whether existing rate-payers should foot the bill for new growth and suburbanization).
... See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 602 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0959.pdf.
... See id.
... Adler, supra note 99, at 746.
... See id.
"' See contra, TEX. WATER & UTIL. CODE ANN. § 572.061 (2014).
112 Glennon, supra note 18, at 1883.
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utility's costs for items including current operation and maintenance, capital
costs, and debt service.403 This constrains rate collection, which is the price
placed on water, to costs that have already been incurred. 404 Once
inexpensive water resources are depleted and the utility is forced to seek new
expensive supply, increasing rates.40 5 Changing the cost of service paradigm
could also change this result.
One of the problems with current cost of service models is that the
ratemaking is based on historical costs rather than future costs. 40 6 The goal
with a broader model is to make an effort to capture at least some of those
costs to send a price signal earlier and avoid a capacity overinvestment.
Even with increasing rates based on increased capital costs, most rates are
still reactive.40 7 In order to send the appropriate price signal, rates need to
include costs of extra production and treatment that will be necessary if
water is not used efficiently. 408 This incorporation of avoided supply costs
at least in part would make the water market more reflective of water in its
high value capacity.409
The purpose of rate setting is to provide enough income to allow the
utility to provide services without the need of government subsidies as well
as manage demand. 410 The current market approach to pricing excludes
many factors, which does not fully inform market drivers. Price does not
reflect water's full intrinsic value.411 This inaccurate price signal creates
unintended consequences. 41 Externalities that currently are not given value
including extraction or development costs should be included in a cost of
service analysis and included in rates or additional fees. 41
3
"Cost" requires a definition broader than what might be traditionally
used.4 " Diversifying what is considered would allow rates to both achieve
the utility's revenue requirements while informing consumers of the non-
monetary costs of their use such as private and social impacts of expanded
401 See, e.g., TEX. WATER & UTIL. CODE ANN. § 572.061 (2014).
404 Glennon, supra note 18, at 1883.
405 See id. at 61-62.
406 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 32.
401 See id. at 19.
408 id.
401 See discussion supra Part III.A. 1 (explaining that reduction inusage can save ratepayers exponentially
in the future).
410 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 70.
411 See discussion supra Part II.B.
412 See discussion supra Part II.B.
411 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 7. Other costs associated with new supply
may include land impacts, energy, and pollution costs. See e.g., WATEREUSE ASS'N, SEAWATER
DESALINATION POWER CONSUMPTION 2 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.watereuse.org/
sites/default/files/u8/Power consumption whitepaper.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014); Heather Cooley,
et al., Desalination of Seawater Can Do More Harm Than Good, PACIFIC INSTITUTE (2013)
http://pacinst.org/publication/desal-marine-impacts/; Bill Hanna, Tarrant Water District to Take Parcel
From Pipeline Opponent by Eminent Domain, STAR TELEGRAM (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.star-
telegmm.com/2014/02/18/5580027/water-district-votes-to-use-its.html.
414 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 70.
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development and delivery. 15 If buyers understood, through price signals,
that adopting efficient uses now could bypass that end result, their behavior
might change accordingly. 416 A more expansive definition that includes
avoided supply could be defended as prudent or reasonable under the legal
standard.417 In essence, ratepayers are paying a small price up front to avoid
an emergency later.418
While rate design is legally required to remain revenue neutral, limiting
utilities to a fair rate of return, an inclusive calculation of costs allows for a
broader cost of service determination. 419 So long as the projected costs are
measurable and defensible, they should be legally included.420 Precedent
exists for a more liberal interpretation of COS.
421
Cost of service like value has many meaning.422 As such, flexibility for
its application is built-in. 423 This flexibility is seen in one of the scholar
Bonbright's criteria for rate design. He states rates should reflect both
present and future private and social costs. 4 24 Bonbright argues that one
purpose of rates is to control demand through pricing with the goal that
customers will weigh the total cost of using a resource.425 This also obligates
the inclusion of externalities, which cannot be accomplished through
reactionary rates that use a limited interpretation of cost.426
One way water utilities could build avoided shortage into the cost of
service in a proactive way is to use a process used by electric utilities called
Integrated Resource Plans (IRP). "In an integrated resource plan ("IRP"), a
utility evaluates available resources and forecasted demand over an extended
period of time to determine the optimal mix of resources to reliably meet
customer load requirements at the lowest reasonable cost. ' 42 7 IRPs move
415 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 22.
416 YOUNG, supra note 57, at 135-37.
417 See BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 70-71. "A cost is always a cost of something to some individual
or group of individuals." Id. at 72. An internalization of the external costs of supply depletion would
significantly change a cost of service paradigm. See Hardberger, supra note 48, at 932-34; BONBRIGHT,
supra note 20, at 72.
418 See, e.g., Paul Rogers, California Drought: 17 Communities Could Run Out of Water Within 60 to
120 Days, State Says, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014, 6:28PM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci-25013388/california-drought- 17-communities-could-rn-out-
water.
419 See ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 10. In April 2015, a California state
appellate court ruled that a tiered pricing system may violate state laws by charging more for services
that their costs are to provide the water. Schwartz, supra note 192. These limited views of cost of service
do more harm than good.
411 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 12.
421 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 230-33.
422 BONBRIGHT, supra note 20, at 69.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 72-73. "Only in this way can the customers be put in a position... to ration themselves by
striking a balance between benefits received and sacrifices imposed." Id. at 69.
42 5 
Id. at 72.
426 See id at 70.
427 Inara Scott, TeachingAn Old DogNew Tricks: AdaptingPublic Utility Commissions To Meet Twenty-
First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV.ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 409 (2014).
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away from keeping costs as low as possible until a shortage occurs, they
actually "compare the costs and risks associated with a variety of
portfolios. 4 28 By doing this, utilities can better optimize when new supply
technologies should be built and well as send a price signal to customers to
slow down that obligation, while still allowing them to ultimately save
money on the costs of avoided supply.429
An inclusive reading of costs, particular those that include societal costs
of depletion could be defensible under a broader reasonableness standard.430
Rates that protect water resources and save ratepayers future rate increases
should qualify as prudent actions. 431 Because the prudence review is the
substitute for market competition, the utility would in essence be
telegraphing a market signal that would not normally exist because of the
utility model.432 Although this is not the traditional way "prudent" has been
interpreted by courts, the limited nature of water resources should dictate a
new understanding of the term.433
B. Diversify Demand Projections
Demand projections are the basis for water supply decision-making and
subsequent ratemaking. If a utility underestimates, there will not be enough
water for their customers. If they continue to overestimate, as they have
historically, customers will foot the bill for unnecessary expenses and the
business model becomes threatened.434 The trend of increased costs and
declining sales seen across the U.S,, forcing a new look at how demand is
calculated.435
Traditionally, utilities used very limited methodology to predict
demand. Future water needs were ascertained by estimating population
growth and extrapolating using present per capita demand. The problem
with this method is that it assumes water will be used in the same way as it
has in the past, leading to inaccurate results. Appliances use less water than
before and, as water prices increase, customers respond by using less
threatening financial ruin for the water provider.
Customer consumption is the basis for future sales. "A customer's
demand is based upon the need or desire for the service, the ability to pay
for it, and the availability of substitutes. 43 6 Determining demand in a more
42 8 Id.
421 Id; Grafton et al., supra note 258, at 54-55.
430 HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 230-33.
431 See id. at 235.
432 See id.
433 Contra HEMPLING, supra note 244, at 238-42.
434 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 139. In addition to the obvious threat lack of
revenue creates, financial institutions will downgrade utilities that over-predict demand. Id. at 140.
435 Id. at 139.
436 PHILLIPS, supra note 279, at 412.
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complex and integrated way will lead to more accurate rate predictions and
infrastructure build-out. To do this, historical assumptions must be replaced
with accurate information about customers' demand patterns broken down
to individual users or segments of user.437 This includes examining not only
who is using the water, but also which portions of those uses are elastic
versus inelastic.
In lieu of linear numeric extrapolations based on population, multi-
faceted demand modeling can allow a utility to add in factors that are locally
relevant. In addition to population, some additional factors for consideration
include local climate, customer usage data, rates and rate structures,
demographic shifts, conservation programming and policy changes such as
new land use limitations. Price elasticity will also need to be included in
any calculation.438
The non-profit group Alliance for Water Efficiency (AWE) recently
released a user guide for their sales forecasting model. The model allows
users to apply billing data to rate structures to estimate performance and
compare that to revenue goals.439 The model consists of two modules: the
rate design module and the revenue simulation model.440 The simulation
attempts to address deficiencies in tradition demand projection calculations
by including customer demand variability,441 demand response, drought
pricing, probability management and fiscal sustainability.442 In addition to
the AWE model, several other software options provide the ability model
these more complex scenarios.443 Although these programs require more
effort that traditional rate modeling, they could lead to increased resilience
and rates protection in the long run.
C. Adopt Rate Setting Best Practices
Rates are an opportunity for a utility to communicate with their
customers by using price as an indicator of demand and trigger behavior
accordingly. However, to be effective, rates must be constructed using best
practices and must be seen as more than a mechanism for basic cost
recovery. Traditional rate structures that are not tied to consumption or those
that keep prices artificially low create volatility in the revenue stream that
can threaten long-term sustainability. This is particularly true during
extreme weather situations when consumers respond to the natural
... WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 140.
... ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 64-65.
... ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 232, at 5.
440 Id.
441 The model divides annual water use into peak and off-peak seasons. Id. This helps the utility identify
the inelastic demand, which is critical in predicting demand response. See id.
442 Id. The revenue module allows the utility to run a weather-based scenario, such as a wet year, to see
how that would affect revenue goals. Id. at 9.
441 PACIFIC INSTITUTE, supra note 217, at 3-4.
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environment to the detriment of an ill-prepared utility. Balancing price
signals with tools that stabilize revenue while protecting low-income users
can create community and utility sustainability.
1. The Steeper the Better
When determining a rate structure, utilities should adopt one that
provides the biggest price signal to consumers, while still maintaining low
prices for a basic quantity of water. This means that the rate system needs
to be consumption based.444 Arguably any rates that are predicated on usage
encourage conservation; however, some send more effective price signals
than others. An inverse tiered system is generally the most conservation-
oriented structure particularly when they are more punitive to high use
customers. However, tiers alone will not create the necessary price signal.445
Rate levels are as important as the structure itself and rate structures should
be tailored the local behavior.446
Tiered rate structures should target the elastic or discretionary portion
of water demand particularly in areas with a high peak demand.4 47 One
factor that determines price elasticity of demand is the income effect of a
product.448 When a price increases, people usually cannot afford to buy the
same amount of that product as they could at the previous price. 449 The
greater the proportion of an individual's income needed to purchase the item,
the greater the impact of the price increase on consumer demand.450 That
demand is elastic. 451 The lower the need for a product or ability to pay, the
more elasticity.452 Elasticity is also greater when a customer can buy the
same or similar product from another supplier.453
Basic uses of water are inelastic. A user cannot simply require less water
for health and hygiene because the price goes up, but those uses account for
a very small percentage of household uses. 454 Some indoor uses can be
reduced through more efficient plumbing or behavior modifications, but the
... See discussion supra Part C. 1.
115 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 42. "Poorly designed inclining block rates can
be less effective in promoting efficiency than well-conceived declining or uniform volume rates, and
they can impose profound inequities." Id. at 44.
446 Id. at 41-42.
... See Adler, supra note 99, at 746; ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 7.
... BADE & PARKIN, supra note 59, at 116.
... Id. "The sensitivity of customers to price changes depend on income and the availability of alternative
sources of supply." Hughes & Leurig, supra note 140, at 19.
15' BADE & PARKIN, supra note 59, at 116.
451 Id.
452 PHILLIPS, supra note 279, at 412.
453 id.
45 4 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER SENSE, OUTDOOR WATER USE IN THE UNITED STATES (2013),
available at http://www.epa.gov/WaterSense/pubs/outdoor.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
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largest and most elastic water uses occur outdoors.4 55  Pricing structures
need to target discretionary use through a block system that prices the
nondiscretionary uses very low in the first pricing tier, but penalizes uses
that are clearly optional by making the higher use tiers exponentially more
expensive.456 The proper punitive price signal could result in significant
savings both in the short and long term because many users may forgo that
use entirely based on cost.457 While effective, these rate structures can create
revenue volatility so they should be coupled with other income streams. 458
2. Drought Pricing & Peak Shaving
A natural goal related to water allocation protocols is to ensure the
resource does not disappear.459 To achieve this, water must be used in the
most efficient way possible, particularly under drought conditions. 460
Unfortunately, under the current market scheme, price cannot guarantee the
best use ofwater. Instead, price may only respond once the water runs out.
461
At this point, price impacts can be severe, because both the cost of using less
water and the price to purchase and import water would be far higher.462 It
is beneficial to send a price signal earlier and include the cost of inaction in
the current price and avoid the crisis altogether.
One alternative is to levy an additional fee during times of shortage
when the utility needs to send an immediate price signal unrelated to
traditional rates .463 This temporary drought surcharge would help avoid
shortages and more closely align water with its appropriate value under the
circumstances.464 It also avoids the need for a long, politically difficult rate
case, which is not necessary if the shortage is temporary.465
This fee can either be the same for all customers or can be prorated based
on use. Customers with bills in the lower tiers are charged a lower fee, while
those who use the most water pay a higher fee. This methodology is legally
defensible because the latter group is continuing to use discretionary water
45 5 Id. NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N & THE SIERRA CLUB, WATER CONSERVATION BY THE YARD: ESTIMATING
SAVINGS FROM OUTDOOR WATERING RESTRICTIONS 6 (2015); ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY,
supra note 11, at 44.
456 Donnelly & Christian-Smith, supra note 3 11, at 8-9.
457 Id.
451 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 132.
451 TARLOCK, supra note 24, at 15-16.
460 See id.
461 See discussion supra Parl 11.B.3.
462 See discussion supra Parl 11.B.3.
46 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 53-54.
464 See e.g., Steve Raabe, Rising Cost of Gasoline Sparks Return of Fuel Surcharges, THE DENVER POST
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/ci 17588061.
465 See e.g., Yvonne Wenger, City Panel Gets Earful From Residents Angry About Rising Water Bills,
THE BALTIMORE SUN (June 26,2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-06-26/news/bs-md-ci-
water-rate-increase-20130625 1 meter-and-billing-systems-rudolph-chow-water-bills.
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even at a critical time. Drought surcharges should be designed to affect high
users to not punish people who only use basic needs.
In most regions, warmer summer weather is associated with an increase
in demand caused by outdoor watering even when drought is not occurring.
These seasonal peaks can drive water supply development and motivate
utilities to procure capacity that is unutilized for the remainder of the year.466
When this happens, prices are either increased to make up for the capital
costs or the utility must encourage the sale of water. Targeting discretionary
use during these peak times may reduce annual supply demands by reducing
these peak periods.467 Mirroring time-of-day pricing seen in the electric
industry, the price reflects that actual costs at the time of use, inclusive of
resource depletion.
Seasonal rates are distinct from drought fees or surcharges.468 The
former anticipates the peak requirements of a certain season regardless of
rainfall. 469 A surcharge on the other hand, is more suited to specific,
temporary circumstances.470 Customers can also be rewarded for reducing
their peak load through peak rebates.471
3. Utilize Flat Fees
Steep increasing rate structures can provide more affordability to
customers and send a better price signal, but can result in volatile revenues
for the utility, particularly during extreme weather patterns.472 In contrast,
high fixed charges and decreasing rate blocks provide more revenue stability
but may or may not encourage less usage. 47 ' The key is to blend revenue
from these two sources in a way that maintains a price signal while
increasing predictability for the utility.
One alternative to balance base and volumetric charges is to set the
amount of base charge as a certain percentage of the total bill. 474  A
customer's base rate would be set based on a three-month average or the
maximum month of consumption, which would protect low-income users
that do not overuse, reward low-use customers and give some revenue
466 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 10-11.
467 Id. ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 41.
468 Id. An energy sector corollary to this proposal is critical period pricing, which is an add-on to already
commonly utilized time-of-day pricing model. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note
242, at 55. These additional costs would be limited to times of high stress and shortage is threatened. Id.
The process would include notification of the customer to allow for a demand shift coupled with higher
pricing for those who continue to use. Id. This serves to both avoid shortfalls and shave peak demands
through price. Id.
469 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 41.
... Id. at 45.
"1 THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 242, at 56.
472 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 15, at 6.
473 Id.
474 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 45, 149-51.
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predictability. 47  The remainder of the bill would come from variable
consumption-based rates.476 Other flat fees that can be integrated into billing
are connection service fees as well as environmental protection fees
appropriate for a given area.477 Flat fees are particularly useful for the
installation of new equipment, such as a meter. This ties the cost to the
utility with the property necessitating it.478
In addition to protecting the price signal, fees must consider the low-
income user. "' Because fixed charges are more regressive, they can
consume a larger portion of a customer's income for the same amount of
water purchased through consumption-based rates.480
4. Protect Low-Income Users
Although water rates have historically been low, they are rising
rapidly. 481 Rate increases can disproportionately impact low-income
customers. As all utility rates climb, some citizens face difficult decisions
about where their limited income should be allocated. 482  While utility
models move towards using price as a means to affect behavior, these
citizens must be considered. Prohibitions against undue discrimination in
rates require that similarly situated customers are treated similarly, but that
does not mean there are not protective options.483 A low-income customer
may not be subject to a different rate structure than someone of higher
income, but they can be treated differently based on use patterns, which
often has the same effect. 484 Other protective mechanisms are also possible.
The first category of low-income alternatives can be found in the actual
rate systems. Lifeline rates are based on the understanding that certain low-
income and fixed-income elderly customers should be provided an
affordable rate because they cannot afford basic necessary.485 Low-income
affordability subsidies can take several forms. There can be a separate
115 Mary Tiger, PeakSet Base: A Pricing Model for Utility Revenue Stability and Customer Conservation,
UNC ENvTL. FINANCE BLOG (July 10, 2012), http://efc.web.unc.edu/2012/07/10/peakset-base-a-
pricing-model-for-utility-revenue-stability-and-customer-conservation/.
476 Id.
477 For example, fees canbe useful to help fund costs associated with habitat conservation plans in regions
with endangered species concerns. WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 212.
471 See discussion, supra Part III.C.2.
471 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 108, at 9.
480 Id.
481 LEURIG, supra note 178 at 14. Water rates recently surpassed cable television as the most rapidly
rising household service. Id. In Fort Worth, the cost of raw water increased almost ten percent in one
year and city officials expect it to double over the next ten years, all of which will impact rates. Hirst,
supra note 175.
482 See HUGHES & LEURIG, supra note 144, at 19.
4' Hempling, supra note 244, at 288-89. Many states have passed affordability acts permitting subsidy
rates. WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 190.
414 Hempling, supra note 244, at 288-89.
415 Phillips, supra note 280, at 425.
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discounted rate for a limited qualities or a percentage discount can be applied
to the total bill.48
6
Low-income protection can be also accomplished by setting bottom tier
rates very low for all users.487 Some experts have suggested the bottom tier
should be provided for free. 488  Fees can also be waived in lieu of a
consumption-based subsidy. 489 The goal is to supply a basic amount of non-
discretionary water at a very affordable rate.490 Critics of this system feel
that lowering the price dilutes the price signal; however, this system could
arguably promote conservation as more people try to qualify for that rate
reduction by using less water.49'
Utilities that are not legally permitted to have lifeline rates or prefer to
avoid them, citing concerns that the price signal will be weakened, may offer
cost relief through non-pricing mechanisms. 492  One example of this is
providing home audits and subsidization for any available retrofits. 3
Although this has an up-front cost, it is short-term and leads to ongoing
savings so may be less expensive in the long-term. One of the challenges
presented by any affordability programs is determining who must pay for
the assistance program or the revenue shortfall produced by someone paying
less than the cost of service. 49 Some utilities make up this shortfall through
revenue earned from the highest tier users. Another alternative is to simply
provide direct financial assistance through bill payment aid through the
utility itself, other municipal sources, or local charities. 495
A combination of programs is highly recommended to ensure maximum
support of at-risk communities. For example, Portland, Oregon provides a
low-income bill discounts; crisis assistance in cases of emergencies; budget
billing, which allows customers to pay in a way on a schedule that works for
them; and bill write offs in special circumstances based on employee
discretion.496 In addition to bill-specific assistance, the city also works with
community members to reduce their water usage through education and
486 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 52.
... THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 242, at 94.
... Glennon, supra note 21 at 311, 340. Although some groups question this methodology, affordability
is defined by the Environmental Protection Agency to be less than 2.5% of a community's median
household income. WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 186-87.
.. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 242, at 94.
... ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 52.
491 It is also worth noting, that low-income customers are rarely wasteful or high water users. WATER
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 196. Affordability programs may actually save the utility
money through avoided disconnection and mitigation of past due balance accruals. Id.
492 ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY, supra note 11, at 99.
493 Id.
414 Phillips, supra note 280, at 426.
415 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 151, at 188, 190. Some have suggested a direct charge
on all bills to fund affordability programs. Id. at 191. Where this is not possible, customer donation
programs can be established. Id. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 242, at 95-
96 (providing examples bill-assistance programs in the energy sector).
496 WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 15 1, at 189.
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subsidized retrofits. 497 "Affordability programs provide flexibility to
utilities seeking revenue resiliency. "498
Before determining which programs a utility wishes to implement, the
utility must quantify the number of ratepayers who might qualify for the
program. This will provide the total cost to the utility for each program.
Without reliable estimates, a utility risks a large, unexpected shortfall.499 In
addition, they may not adopt programs best suited for their community.5 11
Finally, existing users should not be burdened with the costs of new
growth that is creating the demand. Permitting and implementing impact
fees shift the costs where they belong and alleviate at least some of the
financial impacts on low-income users. Ultimately, the goal is to balance
revenue resilience, conservation, economic growth and affordability. 5 1
Although, on the surface some of these appear to be in conflict, their
interrelation dictates that they be planned in tandem. 2
V. CONCLUSION
Growing populations, limited resources, and climate change challenge
municipal water supplies across the U.S. Historically, water has been
undervalued providing a perverse incentive a utility to sell water rather than
save it. Markets can help fill this void and increase efficiency by assigning
an accurate value to the good sending a price signal that impacts behavior. 3
Current markets lack the ability to send accurate price signals that reflect
the true value of water. 4 This erroneous information leads to unintended
consequences that could rapidly deplete resources rather than protect
them.50 5 The need to ensure market accuracy is particularly important for
water because it is a basic resource for which nothing can be substituted. In
order for a market to be a useful tool in water planning and protection,
adjustments must be made to ensure that all costs are included. 6 Once that
happens, then price signals are correct and consumer decisions can be made
accordingly.
This economic reality can create a disconnect when a water utility's
revenues are predicated on sales. Although on the surface it seems as though
conservation and efficiency measures would challenge the utility business
497 Id.
491 Id. at xxx.
499 Id. at 192-95.
500 Id.
501 TIGER ET AL., supra note 354, at 8.
502 Id.
501 See discussion, supra Part I.B.
504 See discussion, supra Part I.B.
505 See discussion, supra Part I.B.
506 See discussion, supra Part I.B.
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model, this is not necessarily the case.507 Revenue shortfalls are often a
function of not enough conservation, not too much.5 o8  When utilities
manage water needs through conservation, including price signals, they
minimize the amount of elasticity and create more predictable revenues. 9
Water shortages are becoming more common as competition for access
increases. As populations shift to municipal areas, it is critical that water
providers adopt more complex demand projections that better understand
market reactions and predict supply needs.510 Market adjustments need to
be made in the municipal business model to ensure a revenue stream while
targeting discretionary uses, such as outdoor watering.511
Utilities also need to be given the ability to set their rates in a way that
does not simply recoup costs, but actually encourages conservation and
efficiency.512 Water providers need the ability to charge more for existing,
less expensive supplies to avoid the need to build more expensive
technologies that may disincentivize conservation programs, which saves
money over the long-term. 513 Additional fees can be collected regularly or
just during drought periods on a pro rata basis to trigger an immediate
demand response. 514 Adopting best practices can both ensure a secure water
supply while reducing business volatility.
511 See discussion, supra Part III.A.
511 See discussion, supra Part III.A.
511 See discussion, supra Part III.A.
510 See discussion, supra Part III.A.3.
511 See discussion, supra Part III.
512 See discussion, supra Part IV
511 See discussion, supra Part IV.
514 See discussion, supra Part IV.
2015]
